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Abstract 
Operating procedures are guidance for operators to monitor, make decision and 
take related counter actions in normal, abnormal and emergency conditions of nuclear 
power plants. The initial form of operating procedures, paper-based procedures (PBPs), 
have some drawbacks such as high operators’ workload and necessity of much time to 
find and execute procedures related to the events. Therefore, because of the development 
of computer and information technology, computer-based procedures (CBPs) were 
developed to overcome the problems. CBPs provide more benefits, such as dynamic 
information representation, providing navigational links to other necessary procedures, 
providing path tracking in the procedure and providing supplementary information related 
to the procedure.  
In emergency condition, after identifying the accident based on the symptoms and 
anomalies in the plant, operators should take appropriate actions following the 
instructions in the emergency operating procedures (CBPs). Such counteractions, 
indicated by the change of states of components, consequently affect other plant 
components and also the plant behavior. The information (components influenced and 
future plant behavior) is important and useful for operators to help them to predict and 
anticipate the future condition of the plant. However, most of CBPs do not provide this 
additional information. The lack of this information will decrease the situation awareness 
of operators. In addition, in the era of resilience, operators are expected to have the ability 
to anticipate the future condition of the plant. Therefore, the thesis discusses the additional 
information as the desirable features for CBPs to increase the situation awareness of 
operators and to achieve resilience system. 
MFM as a functional modeling is used to investigate how to derive the additional 
information. The counter actions are modeled by the control function of MFM, which is 
used to change the state of a function primitive of MFM model of PWR plant based on 
an operation knowledge described in the EOP of SGTR accident. The thesis also discusses 
the technique to derive the additional information using algorithm based on causal effect 
relation and influence propagation. The information is presented in the form of 
explanation sentences which is understandable by human operators. The information is 
displayed on the CBP user interface each time an operator selects a specified procedure 
step. 
  
ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Akio Gofuku 
for the continuous support of my PhD study and related research, for his patience, 
motivation, and immense knowledge. His guidance helped me in all the time of research 
and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor 
for my PhD study.  
I would like to convey my gratitude to Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher 
Education for granting scholarship Program for Research and Innovation in Science and 
Technologies (RISET-Pro) grant number 8245-ID for the completion of my doctoral 
studies. I would also like to acknowledge JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 16H03136 
which was partially supported my research activities. 
I would like to thank Dr. Tetsushi Kamegawa and Dr. Taro Sugihara for the 
constructive comments in the interim presentation in our laboratory and also lab members 
for supporting my research activities in the laboratory. I would like also to thank my 
friends who always support during my life in Okayama in the past years. 
Finally, most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, my lovely wife and my 
two daughters for the moral support and the prayer. 
  
iii 
 
Contents 
 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. i 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ ii 
Contents ........................................................................................................................... iii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... v 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................. vii 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Background ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Research theme .................................................................................................. 2 
1.3. Thesis structures ................................................................................................ 4 
2. Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 5 
2.1. Computer-based Procedures .............................................................................. 5 
2.1.1. Overview of Operating Procedures ............................................................ 5 
2.1.2. Computer-based Emergency Operating Procedures ................................... 7 
2.2. Operator Support Systems ............................................................................... 11 
2.3. Situation Awareness ........................................................................................ 15 
2.4. Resilience Engineering .................................................................................... 20 
2.5. Functional Information .................................................................................... 24 
3. Techniques to Derive the Additional Information Based on MFM Models ........... 27 
3.1. Overview of MFM ........................................................................................... 27 
3.2. MFM Symbols ................................................................................................. 28 
3.3. MFM Reasoning .............................................................................................. 29 
3.4. Influence Propagation ...................................................................................... 32 
3.5. Modeling of a Counteraction by MFM Control Function ............................... 34 
3.6. Algorithms to Derive the Additional Information ........................................... 36 
3.6.1. Components influenced ............................................................................ 36 
3.6.2. Future plant behavior ................................................................................ 38 
3.7. Explanation Sentences ..................................................................................... 39 
iv 
 
3.7.1. Components influenced ............................................................................ 39 
3.7.2. Future plant behavior ................................................................................ 40 
4. Modeling of PWR Plant and Emergency Operating Procedure .............................. 42 
4.1. Outline of PWR Plant ...................................................................................... 42 
4.2. MFM Model of PWR Plant ............................................................................. 43 
4.3. Modeling of EOP of SGTR ............................................................................. 44 
4.3.1. STEP 1: Occurrence of SGTR thereafter reactor trip and safety injection46 
4.3.2. STEP 2: Check RCP restart criteria, if not meet, trip all RCPs, otherwise 
go to STEP 3 ........................................................................................................... 48 
4.3.3. Identification and isolation of faulted steam generator ............................ 50 
4.3.4. RCS cooldown using steam dump through SG PORV or steam dump 
valve 51 
5. Application Results and Discussions of Deriving Additional Information............. 54 
5.1. Reactor trip and safety injection ...................................................................... 54 
5.2. Check RCP restart criteria ............................................................................... 59 
5.3. Identification and isolation of faulted steam generator.................................... 60 
5.4. RCS cooldown using steam dump through SG PORV or steam dump valve . 62 
5.5. Applicability Evaluations ................................................................................ 63 
5.5.1. Contribution to Situation Awareness ........................................................ 64 
5.5.2. Contribution to Reduce Human Errors ..................................................... 65 
6. Preliminary Design of CBP User Interface with the Desirable Feature .................. 67 
6.1. Process of Displaying the Additional Information .......................................... 67 
6.2. Design of the CBP User Interface .................................................................... 69 
6.3. Evaluation of the Design of the CBP User Interface ....................................... 71 
7. Conclusions and Future Works ............................................................................... 74 
References ...................................................................................................................... 76 
 
  
v 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.2-1. Outline of the research ......................................................................... 3 
Figure 1.2-2. Relationship among functional information, situation awareness and 
resilience engineering ........................................................................................ 4 
Figure 2.1.1-1. Procedure hierarchy for various operation condition [7] .............. 5 
Figure 2.1.2-1. An example of CBP user interface (ImPRO) [15]............................ 8 
Figure 2.1.2-2. Hierarchical structure of procedure, step and action [15] ................ 9 
Figure 2.1.2-3. Comparison between PBP and CBP operation [10] ......................... 9 
Figure 2.2-1. Classification of operator support systems and HMI [22] ................. 12 
Figure 2.2-2. Information flow of direct and indirect supports ............................... 14 
Figure 2.3-1. Situation awareness and decision making [26] ................................. 16 
Figure 2.4-1. Different views of work and activities in safety-I [34] ..................... 21 
Figure 2.4-2. Four cornerstone of resilience engineering [31] ................................ 22 
Figure 2.4-3. Step to resilience (adopted from [38]) ............................................... 22 
Figure 2.5-1 Structure models of a gasoline and an electric car [6]........................ 25 
Figure 2.5-2. Functional model of a car [6] ............................................................ 25 
Figure 3.2-1. MFM symbol ..................................................................................... 29 
Figure 3.4-1 Influence propagation ......................................................................... 33 
Figure 3.5-1. MFM control function ....................................................................... 35 
Figure 3.6-1. Algorithm to derive components influenced information ................. 37 
Figure 3.6-2. Algorithm to derive future plant behavior information ..................... 39 
Figure 4.1-1. Simplified diagram of PWR plant ..................................................... 42 
Figure 4.2-1. MFM model of simplified of PWR plant .......................................... 43 
Figure 4.3-1. MFM model of counter actions of reactor trip and safety injection .. 47 
Figure 4.3-2. MFM model of RCP restart criteria operation .................................. 49 
Figure 4.3-3. MFM model isolation of ruptured SG operation ............................... 51 
Figure 4.3-4. MFM model of RCS cooldown using steam dump valve operation . 52 
Figure 5.1-1. Part of MFM model related with reactor trip .................................... 55 
vi 
 
Figure 5.1-2. Part of MFM model related with safety injection and stopping RCS 
operation .......................................................................................................... 57 
Figure 5.2-1. Part of MFM model related with RCP restart criteria operation ....... 59 
Figure 5.3-1. Part of MFM model isolation related with ruptured SG operation ... 61 
Figure 5.4-1. Part of MFM model related with RCS cooldown using steam dump 
valve operation ................................................................................................. 62 
Figure 6.1-1. Process of displaying additional information to the CBP user interface
 ......................................................................................................................... 68 
Figure 6.2-1. Draft of layout of the CBP user interface .......................................... 70 
Figure 6.2-2. The initial display of the CBP user interface………………………..70 
Figure 6.2-3 Displaying the additional information on the CBP user interface…...71 
Figure 6-3-1 Method to evaluate the proposed CBP user interface……………….72 
  
vii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.4-1. Safety-I and Safety-II [35] .................................................................. 21 
Table 3.3-1. Definition of state of MFM ................................................................. 30 
Table 3.3-2 Direct influence for upstream and downstream connections [56] ....... 31 
Table 3.3-3 Indirect influence with influencer relations [56] ................................. 31 
Table 3.3-4 Indirect influence with participant relations [56] ................................ 31 
Table 3.3-5 Rules of means-end relations ............................................................... 32 
Table 3.5-1 MFM control functions ........................................................................ 35 
Table 4.2-1. Description of main functions and objectives..................................... 44 
Table 4.3-1. Simplified of EOP of SGTR [5] ......................................................... 45 
Table 4.3-2. Parameters of modeling of counter actions for reactor trip ................ 47 
Table 4.3-3. Parameters of modeling of safety injection and stopping RCP 
operation .......................................................................................................... 48 
Table 4.3-4. Parameters of modeling of check RCP restart criteria operation ........ 50 
Table 4.3-5. Parameters of modeling of isolation of ruptured SG operation .......... 51 
Table 4.3-6. Parameters of modeling the RCS cooldown operation ....................... 52 
Table 5.1-1. States of function primitives before and after the reactor trip operation
 ......................................................................................................................... 55 
Table 5.1-2. Explanation sentences for the influences of reactor trip operation ..... 55 
Table 5.1-3. Future plant behavior after reactor trip operation ............................... 56 
Table 5.1-4. State of function primitives before and after safety injection and 
stopping RCS ................................................................................................... 58 
Table 5.1-5. Explanation sentences of plant behavior after safety injection and 
stopping RCP operation ................................................................................... 58 
Table 5.2-1.  State of function primitives before and after check RCP restart criteria 
operation .......................................................................................................... 59 
Table 5.2-2. Explanation sentences of plant behavior after check RCP criteria 
operation .......................................................................................................... 60 
Table 5.3-1. States of function primitives after isolating of ruptured SG ............... 61 
Table 5.3-2. Explanation sentences of the influence of isolation of ruptured SG ... 61 
Table 5.4-1. States of functions before and after RCS cooldown operation ........... 63 
viii 
 
Table 5.4-2. Explanation sentences of influence of RCS cooldown operation ....... 63 
Table 5.5-1 Contribution of additional information derived to situation awareness 
for SGTR accident case ................................................................................... 64 
Table 6.1-1. Group of explanation sentences for isolate ruptured SG .................... 68 
  
Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
In case of an emergency situation of nuclear power plants, a lot of information, 
warning and alarm messages about anomaly of the plant indicated by the deviations 
of some components parameter (temperature, volume or pressure) from normal value 
will be delivered to the operators through display panels and annunciators. Operators 
should recognize the type of the information and alarm messages and then try to 
interpret, diagnose and decide what kind of event/accident happened in the plant and 
select some appropriate emergency operating procedures (EOP) to mitigate the 
accident. The counter actions should be conducted step by step following the 
instructions in the EOP to bring the plant back to safe operation condition and to 
prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment.  
Nowadays, most of modern nuclear power plant main control rooms are 
assembled with computer-based procedures (CBPs) to increase the usability and 
functionalities of EOP by providing dynamic representation of procedure and display 
only relevant steps based on operating mode and plant status [1]. In addition, the 
performance of operators can be increased by using CBPs in terms of reducing 
workload, completion task time and operators’ errors in transition between procedures 
[2].  Therefore, CBPs are developed and intended to make it easier for operators to 
monitor and control the reactor during mitigation the accident and to prevent the 
potential of human error caused by the misconduct of operators. 
Despite the benefits offered by the CBPs, most of them do not provide functional 
information which provide additional information related with the purpose of 
procedure step and the impact of their counter actions to other components and the 
plant behavior. This additional information is useful for operators to understand the 
purpose of the instructions in the procedure. In addition, it is also important to predict 
and prepare the next counter actions related with the future event of the plant caused 
by their counter actions. This thesis studies a propose CBP with the additional 
information feature. The feature is one of the desirable features of the CBP as 
proposed in [3]: functional information display, time remaining display, and dynamic 
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operation permission system. The additional information (components influenced and 
future plant behavior) is displayed on the CBP user interface when operators select a 
specific procedure step on the CBP user interface. By providing this additional 
information, operators will have some views of the impact of their actions before 
taking the counter actions. It will increase the situation awareness of operators during 
emergency condition. 
The operator actions following the instruction in the procedure can be classified 
as cause-effect relations because changing the level or state of a component will 
impact the state of other components in the system. It is relevant with the concept of 
cause-effect relation through control function in multilevel flow modeling (MFM)[4, 
5]. Therefore, the counter actions are modeled by the control function in MFM. In 
addition, the control function is applied to the MFM model of PWR plant. Then by 
implementing cause-effect relation and influence propagation,  the additional  
information of the impact of their actions following the simplified EOP of SGTR 
accident of a PWR plant of Mihama Unit 2 NPP in Japan in 1991 [6] is investigated.  
 
1.2. Research theme 
This thesis proposes the functional information as the desirable features for a 
computer-based emergency operating procedure to increase the situation awareness 
of operators in order to reduce the potential of human error and to achieve resilience. 
The functional information is information related with the effects of their 
counteractions to mitigate the accidents to the other system components and future 
plant behavior. The functional information, which is displayed on the CBP user 
interface, is useful for operators to help them to understand the purpose of the 
procedure steps, to make decision and to take the counter actions. In addition, it is 
also important for predicting and preparing the next counteractions related with the 
future plant behavior. Figure 1.2-1 summarizes the outline of the research. 
The functional information is useful for improving the situation awareness of 
operators during mitigation the accident. The increasing of situation awareness will 
reduce the potential to human error and make it easier to achieve the resilience 
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Figure 1.2-2 shows the relationship among functional information, situation 
awareness and resilience engineering. Functional information, as mentioned in [7] has 
some features such as:  
- It provides information about the role and purpose of each component which 
can be correlated with the system behavior 
- It contains causal relation information which is useful for estimating the effect 
and influence of a counter actions qualitatively 
- It has hierarchical modeling ability which is useful to understand system 
behavior in various level of aggregation. 
- It contains linguistic representation which is important to present the result of 
causal inference to operators in understandable way. 
 
The above features of functional information will support gathering information, 
interpreting the gathered information and anticipating future events in situation 
awareness. The achievement of capabilities in situation awareness then encourage the 
capabilities of monitoring and anticipating to achieve the resilience system. 
The applicability of providing the additional information to the CBP user interface 
can be confirmed from some studies results which mention that CBPs should provide 
high level information related to the procedure goals which help operators to 
understand the system as an object of action and recognize the intention of counter 
actions. In addition, some studies also give results that providing the functional 
information will increase the situation awareness of operators, especially the 
information of future plant behavior 
Emergency 
Plant 
MFM 
model 
Counter actions 
• EOP 
•MFM control 
function 
• Influence 
propagation 
Functional information 
• Component influenced 
• Future plant behavior 
 
CBP 
GUI 
Situation 
Figure 1.2-1. Outline of the research 
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Figure 1.2-2. Relationship among functional information, situation awareness and 
resilience engineering 
  
1.3. Thesis structures 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background and 
methodology of the research. Chapter 2 provides the review of some literatures about 
the operator support system and computer-based procedure, the situation awareness 
of operators in the plant, and overview of functional modeling and its implementations. 
Chapter 3 introduces the techniques to derive the additional information. Chapter 4 
presents the modeling the simplified PWR plant and the emergency operating 
procedure which is used to mitigate the accident applied to the PWR plant. Chapter 5 
describes the application results and discussions of deriving the additional 
information and the applicability evaluations related with contributions to increasing 
the situation awareness and to reduce human errors. Chapter 6 introduces the 
preliminary design of the CBP user interface with the desirable feature. Finally, 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and some future works.  
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Chapter 2 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Computer-based Procedures 
This section discusses the overview of operating procedures which describes the 
hierarchy of operating procedures based on the level of anomalies happened in a plant 
from normal condition to severe accident conditions. Then, the discussion is only 
focused on emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and the development of 
computer-based emergency operating procedures. 
 
2.1.1. Overview of Operating Procedures 
 Operation procedures provide information and guidance for operators to 
operate and monitor the plant during normal operation; and help them to make 
decision and taking counter actions during an emergency condition to mitigate the 
accident and to bring the plant into safe operation condition. The information and 
guidance are combined to minimize human error. Figure 2.1-1 shows the 
hierarchy of procedures for various operation conditions [8]. According to Figure 
2.1-1, system operating procedures are used for normal plant operation, such as 
how to start up and to shut down the plant and operating the plant in normal power 
operation. Operators have to make sure that the plant is operated within specified 
limits and conditions.  
 
Figure 2.1-1. Procedure hierarchy for various operation condition[8] 
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 During the life time of the plant, some anomalies may happen in the plant. 
Based on the anomalies, the plant conditions can be divided into three conditions: 
abnormal conditions, accident/emergency conditions, and severe accident 
conditions depending on the severity of the anomaly. In abnormal conditions, the 
anomalies do not cause any significant damages to safety related components and 
can be handled by normal control systems. The anomalies are indicated by the 
alarm messages and changing the parameter level of components from the normal 
setpoints. In this case, operators should implement an appropriate alarm response 
procedure to identify the anomalies. In some cases, the abnormal operation may 
change to a more complex operation condition if the malfunctions happened in 
core cooling system or in a support system. Operators should do the counter 
actions to compensate the malfunctions or faults following the abnormal operating 
procedures (AOPs). Examples of abnormal conditions are malfunction of a 
component of normal running plant and a fault in the function of a component of 
control system [8]. 
 Moreover, accident or emergency condition, as defined by the IAEA is 
“deviations from normal operation more severe than anticipated operational 
occurrences, including design basis accidents, beyond design basis accidents and 
severe accidents” [8].  Examples of accident conditions are steam generator tube 
rupture (SGTR), loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and loss of offsite power 
(LOOP). In case of emergency, the procedure used is emergency operating 
procedure (EOP). Operators should follow the EOP to control the plant and cannot 
only rely on their knowledge and experiences.  
 Finally, the last procedure or guidance is severe accident guidelines 
(SAGs), which is used to mitigate severe accident conditions. Severe accident 
conditions are accidents which include significant core degradation. SAGs are 
used when the EOPs cannot effectively preventing the core damage. Compared 
with EOPs which focus on preventing core damage, SAGs concentrate on 
maintaining other barriers for protecting the release of radioactive materials to 
public. 
Another important thing derived from Figure 2.1-1, is the transition 
between individual groups of procedures (AOPs, EOPs and SAGs). It is owing to 
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the fact that in emergency condition, operators will work with unusual situation 
and unexpected plant behaviour in stressful situation. Therefore, they need reliable 
guidelines to properly make decision and take the actions to mitigate the abnormal 
or accident condition in the limited time available. An example is the transition 
between AOPs and EOPs which defines the entry condition into EOPs, reactor 
trip or emergency core cooling system actuation [8]. 
 
2.1.2. Computer-based Emergency Operating Procedures 
Operators as humans have important roles in monitoring and controlling the 
plant. As the nature of humans, they have some limitations. They cannot only rely 
on their knowledge acquired from education and training and their working 
memory during conducting their works. Some factors, such as panic, confusing 
and stressful situation may affect and degrade their performance and capabilities, 
especially in an emergency condition. Therefore, some guidance or operating 
procedures are needed to help them to overcome the problems. Literature [9] 
mentioned that good procedures will help operators to reduce physical/mental 
workload, to reduce the potential of human errors, and to maintain their 
performance. In case of accident conditions, good emergency operating 
procedures (EOPs) will aid operators to mitigate the accidents. 
 Initially, in traditional main control rooms of nuclear power plants, EOPs 
are available in the form of printed documents as paper-based procedures (PBPs). 
However, PBPs have some drawbacks in terms of how to obtain information and 
their interactive abilities [10]. Other disadvantages are it is hard for operators to 
arrange, scan and read the PBP while conducting monitoring and controlling 
tasks; and it will take a long time in the diagnosis process of the plant status [11]. 
Moreover, there are some cognitive workload related to the working with the 
PBPs, such as managing multiple procedures at one time, keeping track the 
currently used procedures, going through some loops before obtaining the correct 
information to diagnose the plant status [12]. Furthermore, the static information 
presented in the PBPs which does not express the actual plant condition [12] also 
make it difficult for operators to manage the PBPs. 
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 Due to some disadvantages of PBPs mentioned above and because of the 
development of computer and information technology, computer-based 
procedures (CBPs) were developed. CBPs are designed to help operators and 
reduce workload related to the usage of PBPs in monitoring and controlling 
nuclear power plants. CBPs have been introduced in modern and advanced main 
control rooms of nuclear power plants, such as COMPRO [13] , COPMA-II [14], 
N4 Procedure [15], IMPRO [16, 17] and CPS [11]. Figure 2.1-2  shows an 
example of CBP user interface (ImPRO) [16]. 
 
 
Figure 2.1-2. An example of CBP user interface (ImPRO) [16] 
 
The CBP shown in Figure 2.1-2 uses a flowchart and logic tree diagram format. 
The flowchart represents the procedure and steps in a hierarchical structure owing 
to the fact that the objective of a procedure is achieved by completing the 
objectives of successive steps. In addition, some appropriate actions should be 
conducted to achieve the objective of each step. The hierarchical structure of 
procedure, step and action is provided in Figure 2.1-3 [16]. 
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Figure 2.1-3. Hierarchical structure of procedure, step and action [16] 
 
CBPs are integrated with visual display units (VDUs) and computer input 
devices (keyboard, mouse and/or touchscreen) and are located on the operators’ 
workstation desks.  In addition, in case of the malfunction of CBP, a backup 
should be provided, usually paper-based procedure. In this case, the seamless 
transition from CBP to PBP should be considered.  
 
 
Figure 2.1-4. Comparison between PBP and CBP operation [11] 
 
 Figure 2.1-4, adopted from [11], summaries the difference between PBP and 
CBP comparison. In traditional main control rooms with PBP operations, 
operators should conduct monitoring and controlling the plant while finding the 
necessary information and guidelines by scanning and reading the PBPs. These 
conditions will increase the operators’ cognitive workload and reducing 
operators’ situation awareness. The impacts are, it will take long time to collect 
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and diagnose the plant status that may endanger the plant behaviour and increase 
the potential of human errors.  On the other hand, in CBP operations, all the 
necessary data can be provided at the operator consoles. It will make it easier for 
operators to collect the information, judge the exact plant status and then make 
correct decision and take the appropriate actions. Therefore, CBPs have positive 
impacts on the performance of operators by reducing time for completion the task, 
reducing workload and reducing errors in transition between procedures [18] . 
 CBPs can be divided regarding the functionality provided by the CBPs: 
Type 1 CBP, Type 2 CBP and Type 3 CBP [18]. The type 1 CBPs (electronic 
procedure) is an electronic version of the PBP with little additional functionality. 
The procedures are presented in text or graphical format. The type 2 CBPs 
(Computer-based procedures) provide more functionalities such as automatic 
information retrieval and display, automatic step logic processing and display of 
results to support operators’ decision making. The Type 3 CBPs (CBPs with 
procedure-based automation) incorporates all the functionalities of the Type 3 
CBPs including the ability to send control commands. This type of CBPs enables 
to deal with multiple procedure steps.  
 In general, as described by [19], CBPs contain identity (title, procedure 
number, revision number, and date), steps of action in the form of verb and a direct 
object, warning, cautions, notes and supplementary information. The information 
is presented on the CBPs in the form of texts, graphics or combination of texts 
and graphs. Furthermore, some major issues related with the implementation of 
CBP in nuclear power plants are also considered [17]: 
- Writing the procedure correctly and kind of information should be presented 
in the procedure. 
- Format of the correct procedure and presentation of information in the 
procedure for easy comprehension 
- Execution of correct procedure without any mistakes. 
- Marking the procedure that has been conducted by one operator so that other 
operators in a team can know the current steps of the procedures. 
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Related to these issues, IEC standard [20] recommends some detailed design 
requirements for designing the computer-based procedures. Some requirements 
discussed in the IEC standard, for examples are types of information should be 
displayed, how to present the information in understandable way and CBPs features. 
In addition, it also discusses the detailed design requirements, verification and 
validation of CBPs, integration with other support systems and training of operators 
for using the CBPs.  O’Hara et.al in NUREG-6634 [21] also mentions the 
requirements for designing CBPs. Most of the standards require that the design of 
CBPs should consider the human factor engineering in order to reduce the potential 
of human errors. 
 
2.2. Operator Support Systems 
Human role is the most important for NPP safety because operators are human 
being, human operators operate NPP, humans engineers determine safety criteria and 
operators check up the fulfilment [22]. Operators also have the main role to monitor 
and control the reactor. As to control functions, some elements should be considered: 
information, identifying the situation, control decision making and control decision 
realization. In order to successfully and safely achieve their tasks, operator support 
systems are developed which will help operators in enhancing the operator 
performance by preprocessing the raw data, interpreting the plant state, prioritizing 
goals and providing advices [23].  
There are some classifications of operator support systems. Fist classification is 
based on the above elements: informational support system, support system for 
situation evaluation, support system for making a control decision and support system 
for control decision realization. [22]. Another classification is based on the integration 
with the human machine interface (HMI) as can be seen in Figure 2.2-1 [23]. In 
traditional main control rooms (MCRs), which most of the systems are controlled by 
analog systems, the  operator support systems are installed as independent systems to 
provide additional information [23]. On the other hand, in modern main control rooms, 
the operator support systems are integrated with HMI [23]. Comparing with the 
traditional MCR which operators may not use the information from the support 
systems because of the high cognitive workload, the additional information of support 
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systems provided in modern MCR is very useful and can reduce the workload. 
Therefore, the purposes of operator support system are to process and present 
information and advice to the operators [22] and to support cognitive process 
activities. In addition, operator support systems offer some benefits to operators in 
terms of increasing availability and reliability; reducing operation and maintenance 
cost; reducing equipment failure, faster fault detection and diagnosis; assisting in 
many areas which are difficult or time consuming; and assisting in planning and 
decision making. 
 
Figure 2.2-1. Classification of operator support systems and HMI [23] 
 
Lee et al [23] mentioned some type of operator support systems which are 
intended to support cognitive activities: 
- Support systems for the monitoring/detection activity 
The purpose of monitoring and detecting activities, which are conducted by the 
instrumentation and alarm systems, is to detect the abnormal situation. The 
anomalies are indicated by the variation of instrumentation level or the changes 
of color or the sounding of the alarms. If there are a lot of alarms repeatedly turn 
on and off during the abnormal situation, it will cause operators confusion and 
panic. Therefore, to overcome this problem, the interface of main control room 
should be improved by providing fully digitalized and computer-based systems 
with large display panel and computer displays. In order to efficiently display the 
information and to make it easier for operators to find a specific control or an 
indicator, the features of key support should be provided in the computer displays 
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[23]. Another solution to overcome the problem is by providing advanced alarm 
system which has capabilities to categorize, filter, suppress and prioritize the 
alarms that let operators to focus on the most important alarms. 
 
- Support system for situation assessment activity 
Situation assessment is the activity that relates with the situation analysis, 
situation modeling and situation explanations. This activity is much easier to be 
conducted if it is supported by the fault diagnosis systems and alarm analysis 
systems. The fault diagnosis system is useful for operation plans based on event-
based procedure because it provides expected faults for fast and easy situation 
assessment. However, for symptom-based procedure of operation plans, which 
the procedure is determined by comparing the procedure entry conditions with the 
current parameters, a system that suggests the appropriate procedure for a given 
situation will be more useful than a fault diagnosis system [23]. 
 
- Support system for the response planning activity 
Response planning activity is conducted after assessing the situation following the 
instructions or steps of written procedures. Initially the written procedure is paper-
based procedures. The information written in paper-based procedures is fixed and 
in natural language which in some cases difficult to understand and may cause 
operators to skip the procedure steps and make omission errors. Therefore, 
computer-based procedures (CBPs) were developed to overcome the drawbacks 
of paper-based procedures. CBPs provide information about procedures and steps, 
relation between the procedures and steps, and parameters needed to operate the 
plant. In order to prevent the omission errors, CBPs offer the feature of check-off 
plan and a brief of candidate operations. 
  
- Support system for the response implementation activity 
Although the response planning activities are based on operating procedures, 
operators may still make errors in executing the selected operation in response 
implementation activities. This type of error is a commission error and should be 
prevented by the response implementation support for example operation 
14 
 
validation system [23]. The purpose of the support system is to detect faulty 
operation and warn operators about them. Another example of response 
implementation support to prevent the commission error is the dynamic operation 
permission proposed by Gofuku et al [24]. The main idea of the system is to 
prevent only obvious commission errors and let operators do whatever they like 
as long as they follow the operation procedures. 
  
Based on how operators process the information, operator support systems are 
divided into direct support and indirect support systems [25]. In the direct support, the 
gathered information can be directly used to execute the actions without any significant 
interpretations. Therefore, it is needed that in the direct support systems, the 
information should be provided in the form of everyday language which is 
understandable by the operators and with less interpretation efforts. CBP, if it is 
considered as a kind of HMI, is an example of direct support system.  
 
 
Figure 2.2-2. Information flow of direct and indirect supports 
 
On the other hand, in the indirect support systems, operators need to interpret the 
perceived information before taking counter actions. Figure 2.2-2 summaries the 
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processing information for direct and indirect support systems [25]. It can be seen from 
the figure that in indirect support systems, after observing and identifying the 
information, operators should diagnose and interpret the information. The results can 
be used for decision making and plan schedule. Then, the actions can be conducted.  
The direct support systems are more suitable for recovery action using the 
instruction and information provided in the EOP without interpreting the information. 
In emergency situation, operators work in stressful condition. Therefore, they need 
clear and understandable instructions to execute the actions without any interpretation 
to mitigate the accident in limited time condition. While the indirect support systems 
are useful for interpreting the current condition based on the anomalies in the plant in 
order to recognize what has occurred and what is going on in the plant. The information 
from alarms, indicators and monitor lights should be interpreted and the results are 
used to make decisions. 
 
2.3. Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness (SA), in general can be defined as the ability of operators to 
establish and keep the adequate understanding of “what is going on” in the system for 
the successful of task performance. The SA can be measured by considering 
characteristic of the task and the aim of analysis. The concept of situation awareness 
initially was used in military to make the soldiers aware of the existence of the enemy. 
Currently, the concept is adopted to aviation, nuclear power plant and emergency 
response [26].  There are several definitions about situation awareness (SA). However, 
mostly used definition is made by Endsley [27]: “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, 
and the projection of their status in the near future”. Endsley also mentioned SA as a 
state of knowledge that results from a process (situation assessment).  
Figure 2.3-1 summaries the definition of situation awareness. There are three 
levels of situation awareness: Level 1 (gathering information), Level 2 (Interpreting 
the gathered information) and Level 3 (anticipating future states). In case of nuclear 
plant, the Level 1 of SA is characterized by the needs of main control room operators 
to know the state of components, parameter levels such as pressure and temperature 
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level of a pressurizer in PWR plant, and alarm information regarding the anomaly in 
the plant.  The ability of operators to understand, to analyze, to classify and to 
integrate the information perceived in Level 1 is the feature of Level 2 of SA. Finally, 
in Level 3 of SA, based on the achievements in Level 1 and 2 of SA, operators should 
be able to predict and anticipate the future events and impact of their actions. 
Therefore, situation awareness is how operators know the current state of the plant 
[28]. The situation awareness can be used to anticipate future plant behavior, to create 
appropriate operation plan and to prevent potential failures [29].  
 
 
Figure 2.3-1. Situation awareness and decision making [27]  
 
In some cases, there are some factors or reasons that cause people may fail in 
achieving the situation awareness. It can be happened, especially in Level 1 and Level 
2 of SA as mentioned by Endsley [27]  and in [26]. In Level 1 of SA it can be caused 
by the unavailability of the data, the difficulty to perceive the data, failure to observe 
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the data and misperception of data. In addition, the lack of mental model, the use of 
incorrect mental model and memory failure are the factors that cause the fail in 
achieving SA in Level 2 of SA. Furthermore, there are some indications that people 
losing the correct situation awareness, such as: ambiguity, confusion, lack of required 
information, failure to maintain critical tasks and failure to meet expected target [26]. 
In nuclear power plant operation, situation awareness is very important and should be 
improved. There are some skills that can be improved to enhance the situation 
awareness in the area of planning, problem solving, attention, team coordination, 
knowledge and communication [26]. 
There are some factors that affect the situation awareness: individual factors and 
system factors [30]. Individual factors consist of attention and working memory. 
Attention is related with the operator receiving information relevant with the task and 
whole description of the plant state. Working memory is used to store the information 
perceived in level 1 of SA and then to integrate with the new information for level 2 
of SA and finally to determine how the future plant behavior is affected by the 
information in level 3 of SA. In order to manage attention and working memory, 
some aspects such as mental models, goal-driven processing, and automaticity should 
be considered [27]. Mental models are indicated by the ability of operators to achieve 
SA by processing and understanding a large amount of information. It can be 
established through training and experience. In addition, a specific goal (to develop 
SA) should be as a basis in the process of perceptions, interpretations and judgements 
to achieve the goal-driven processing. Moreover, automaticity is represented by the 
actions which need few attentional resources. 
On the other hand, the system factors consist of interface design and system 
complexity. SA can be improved by providing good interface design which has 
information integrated from various sources or presents only information that 
operator must attend [31]. There are some external factors that influence the situation 
awareness: task, system, and individual [27]. The task environment includes task 
complexity, workload and pressure and stress. In an emergency condition, some tasks 
should be conducted to bring the plant to a safe operation state in limited time. In 
some cases, this condition will make them stress and then reduce the situation 
awareness. In addition, the necessary information provided by the system also affect 
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the situation awareness. Emergency operating procedures with insufficient 
information provided can cause operators to make a mistake in making decision and 
taking the actions to mitigate the accident. Finally, the individual also affects the 
situation awareness in terms of ability to achieve the situation awareness, ability to 
process the information, and objectives to interpret the environment. 
Situation awareness can be simplified as the ability of operators to know what 
is going on around them. It is relevant with the concept of four cornerstone in 
resilience: learning, monitoring, anticipating and responding [32]. The features 
provided in the functional information will increase the ability of operators in 
perceiving and comprehending the information and also predicting the future event 
in situation awareness, which in turn will support the ability of monitoring and 
anticipating in resilience engineering. Monitoring or “knowing what to look for” 
expresses that operators of a main control room should monitor the plant status and 
be able to find the initiating event related with the anomaly indicated by alarm and 
changes of parameter levels of components in the plant. In addition, the ability of 
operators to direct the potential changes and their impacts due to the counteractions 
(automatic or human actions) is a part of anticipating or “knowing what to expect”. 
It is also related to the ability to identify the possible future behavior, conditions or 
state changes that affect the functionality of the system. The next section will discuss 
the resilience engineering. 
In an emergency situation, operators may feel confuse, nervous, panic and stress 
during their activities to identify, control and mitigate the accidents. In some cases, 
it will reduce the situation awareness of the operators, which in turn it will increase 
the potential to human error and will endanger the plant. Therefore, in order to keep 
and increase the situation awareness, the situation awareness of operators should be 
regularly assessed or measured. There are some methods to measure the situation 
awareness, as mentioned in [33]: 
 
- Freeze probe techniques 
As the name, this technique freezes a random task and blanks all displays and 
screens and applies a set of SA queries regarding the current situation. The 
queries are developed by the Subject Matter Experts (SME).  Then, 
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participant should response the queries based on their knowledge and 
understanding, and the results are compared to the state of the system at the 
freeze point and the SA scores are calculated. Despite the benefit, which is 
the “direct” SA assessment, this technique has some drawbacks in terms of 
the level of intrusion during the task and the validity because it more relies 
on the memories of the participants. An example of this technique is Situation 
Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) which is described in 
[27] 
 
- Real time probe techniques 
This technique is the development of freeze technique in which the task 
proceeds in real time and is not frozen. Although, this technique still has 
problems as in the freeze probe technique, the advantage is, the level of 
intrusion can be reduced. Literature [34] mentions Situation Present 
Assessment Method (SPAM) as an example of real time probe technique. 
 
- Self-rating techniques 
These techniques are conducted as post trial and intended to derive the 
subjective rating of participants’ perceived SA through a rating scale. The 
techniques are easy, quick and low cost to implement and do not have 
intrusion. However, the drawbacks of the techniques are related with the 
collection of SA data post-trial and their sensitivity. The Situation Awareness 
Rating Technique (SART) is an example of self-rating techniques [33].  
 
- Observer techniques 
The SA is measured by SME and based on predefined observable SA related 
behaviors expressed by participants during task performance. These 
techniques can be used in the real worlds because they have no impact on the 
task being performed although they have some questions related to the 
validity. An example of the technique is the Situation Awareness Behavioral 
Rating Scale (SABARS) which is used to assess infantry SA in field training 
exercises [33]. 
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- Performance measures 
The SA is assessed based on the performance of the participants during the 
task and recorded to determine the indirect measure of SA. In military fields, 
the performance is indicated for example by the “kills”, “hits” or mission 
success or failure [33]. 
 
- Process indices 
In these techniques, the way of operators maintains the SA during task 
performance is recorded. For example, using eye tracker to measure 
participant eye movements during task performance, which is used to gather 
information about which parts that got more attention by the participants [33]. 
 
Furthermore, in the field of nuclear power plants, as mentioned in [26], some skills 
of operators should be improved to enhance the situation awareness: planning, 
problem-solving, attention, team coordination, knowledge and communication. 
 
2.4. Resilience Engineering 
Safety, in general can be defined as a condition in which there are no undesired 
issues such as incidents or accidents. It also can be defined as the ability of system to 
ensure that the disturbances to workers, the public and the environment are acceptably 
low [35]. Regarding the concept of safety, Hollnagel [35] defined the safety into 
Safety-I and Safety-II.   
Safety-I focuses on what goes wrong in the system and assumes different views 
of work and activities. “Things go right” if the system is functioned and people work 
as expected. On the other hand, if there are malfunctions or failures it is said that 
“things go wrong”.  Figure 2.4-1 summarizes the different views. The level of safety 
in safety-I is determined by how many things go wrong in the system. 
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Figure 2.4-1. Different views of work and activities in safety-I [35] 
 
Moreover, safety-I concerns about finding the cause of the events, developing an 
appropriate response and action to mitigate and eliminate the events that harm the 
system. Another concern is the prevention of transition from normal to abnormal state 
by increasing compliance and eliminating variability [35].  
Unlike Safety-I, the concern of Safety-II is “what goes right” which means that 
systems should be functioned under varying conditions and more focus on the 
understanding of why things go right. If the system goes wrong, the first thing to do is 
to understand how it always goes right and do not have to find the causes which only 
describe the failure [35]. Literature [36] summarizes the difference between the 
concept of safety-I and safety-II as can be seen in Table 2.4-1. 
  
Table 2.4-1. Safety-I and Safety-II [36] 
 Safety-I Safety-II 
Definition Determined by the number of 
things go wrong 
Determined by the number of 
things go right 
Management of safety Reactive, respond when something 
happens 
Proactive, try to anticipate 
developments and events 
Accidents explanations Caused by failures and 
malfunctions 
Things basically happen in same 
way, regardless of the outcome 
Human factor view Liability resource 
 
The concept of Safety-II is relevant with the resilience engineering. After the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in 2011, the concern of safety concept change 
from safety-I to safety-II. The purpose of resilience engineering is to prevent things 
from going wrong and to assure that things go right. A system is said to be resilience 
if it can adjust its functioning before, during, or following changes and disturbances 
[37]. 
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Moreover, resilient engineering is not about reaching a level of safety but how 
well the organization performs and also does not characterize a state or condition but 
focuses on how process or performance are carried out [26]. Therefore, becoming 
resilience is different from becoming safe. 
Figure 2.4-2 shows the principles of resilience engineering or the four 
cornerstones of resilience engineering [32]. “Knowing what to do” is related with the 
ability to focus on the actual which is how to respond to regular and irregular 
disturbances by applying a set of responses. “Knowing what to look for” is the ability 
to monitor a risk or a potential risk in the near future. It is related with the ability to 
address the critical. In addition, “knowing what to expect” is the ability to address the 
potential, which is how to anticipate potential changes, deviations, pressure and their 
consequences. Finally, the ability to address the factual is important in “knowing what 
has happened”, which is how to learn from experience both successes and failures.  
 
 
Figure 2.4-2. Four cornerstone of resilience engineering [32] 
 
 
Figure 2.4-3. Step to resilience (adopted from [38]) 
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There are some steps for people or systems to achieve resilience [38], as can be 
seen in Figure 2.4-3. These steps related with the improving the four abilities 
differently but not independently. First, for the dysfunctional system, the system only 
has ability to respond the regular and irregular condition in effective and flexible 
manner. Then the abilities are improved to respond and to monitor. The ability to 
monitor related with the monitor short term developments and threats and revise the 
risk models. In this level, a system is in the reactive safety management system. If the 
system can improve its abilities with the ability to learn from the past events and 
understand what happened and why, it becomes in the level of proactive safety 
management system. Finally, the system is resilience if it develops all the abilities 
including to learn, to respond, to monitor and to anticipate (related with the long-term 
threats and potential). 
This thesis focuses on the ability to monitor and to anticipate. As mentioned 
before that monitoring is the ability to monitor a possible threat in the near term which 
happens in the environment and the system itself that need a response. In order to 
properly monitor the system and the environment, a set of valid and reliable indicators 
is needed [39]. Moreover, the time and resources are required to be available and need 
to have a monitor strategy which involve skills and knowledge [40]. In case of nuclear 
power plant, it includes looking at the right instruments and indicators (alarm and 
trends) in the control room, looking through the procedure and monitor the procedure 
progress to ensure that it is properly completed. If the indicators are absent, operators 
should rely on their plant knowledge, situation awareness and problem solving skills 
[39].  
On the other hand, anticipating is the ability to anticipate the potential changes, 
disturbances, changing operating conditions in the near future and their consequences. 
It is related to the ability to address the potential and knowing what to expect and more 
influenced by learning from the past. It also includes the capability to see things from 
different views. Anticipating, compare with monitoring, it is not data-driven and rarely 
a time-critical function. Factors affecting the ability to anticipate are, for examples, 
knowledge and experience, quality of information and the operating procedures [41] 
The operating procedures have correlation with the ability to anticipate provided 
that they have an explicit purpose of each procedure and notes and warning to indicate 
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that something happened in the system due to the deviation of parameter level of 
components. Monitoring and anticipating require operators to look forward in the 
procedures and in the operations as a whole as a means to get ready for the future 
events [39]. 
 
2.5. Functional Information 
Nuclear power plants are equipped with automatic systems which will be 
actuated when an anomaly happened in the plant in order to trip the reactor to stop the 
fission reaction, and so on. However, the role of humans as nuclear operators is very 
important to maintain the safe operation and to mitigate the accident and also bring 
back plant to a safe condition. As mentioned in the previous section, the roles of 
operators include monitoring and controlling tasks. In order to complete the task 
properly, necessary information is needed for the operators. Such information are, for 
examples,  the status of components or equipment, operating state of equipment, 
values of process parameters and condition of equipment and structures [42]. 
Presentation of information should simple and support the operators to perceive 
information easily, and also avoid misunderstanding and cognitive complexity. 
The common information display systems provide the behavioral and structural 
information which is useful to understand the plant situation. However, because of 
the absence of information from the intentional aspect of plants, it is difficult to 
understand the goal and purpose of counter actions mentioned in operating procedures 
or suggested by an operator support system [43]  Therefore, the concept of functional 
information [43] was introduced which express the system in a high level of 
abstraction and why a component exist in the system [7]. As mentioned by Gofuku in 
[7] that “functional information can be a language to bridge a human and a machine 
as it corresponds with the goal-oriented thinking and the understanding process of a 
human”. In addition, functional information should be displayed together with 
behavioral, structural and operational information. Functional information describes 
the reason and background of components that are important for operators to 
understand the plant situation and the suggested actions by the operating procedure.  
The functional information is also useful for understanding the anomalous situation 
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in a system, and finding the plausible counter actions beyond that has been prepared 
in the operating procedures [7]. 
In order to get the functional information, systems are represented in functions  
and objectives that are interconnected using inference relations (functional modeling). 
The inference relations indicate the cause and effect relations among function and 
between functions and objectives. The functional modeling can be explained by 
giving an example of car as discussed in [7] and shown in Figure 2.5-1 and Figure 
2.5-2. There are two types of car based on the generating the driving force, by gasoline 
(Figure 2.5-1. a) and by electric power (Figure 2.5.1.b). The structure, components 
and principle to generate the driving force between the two types of cars are different.  
However, the two types of the cars have the same purpose or function as means to 
travel or to carry baggage. Therefore, in terms of function or purpose, the two cars 
can be redrawn in the same hierarchical model as can be seen in Figure 2.5-2. 
 
 
a. Gasoline engine car 
 
b. Electric car 
Figure 2.5-1 Structure models of a gasoline and an electric car [7] 
 
 
Figure 2.5-2. Functional model of a car [7] 
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Literature [7] mentioned that functional information has some benefits such as: 
• System’s behavior can be associated with the role and purpose of each 
component. It is useful for displaying information how to overcome an 
anomaly situation. 
• The influence and cause-effect relation, in the functional modeling can be used 
to predict the qualitative effect and influence of an operation or a system failure. 
• The system’s behavior can be understood by the hierarchical structure in the 
functional modeling. 
• The semantic gap in communication between operators and computer is 
reduced because of the capability of linguistic representation in functional 
modeling. 
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Chapter 3 
3. Techniques to Derive the Additional Information Based on MFM 
Models 
3.1. Overview of MFM 
Multilevel flow modeling [4, 45, 46] was developed to model a complex plant 
system in terms of goals, functions, multiple levels of means-end and part-whole 
abstraction [46]. The means-end concept is used to model the system functions 
(means) to achieve goal/subgoals (end). In addition, in the part-whole concept, 
systems can be represented as a whole or subsystems in a hierarchical way [47]. MFM 
has three basic concepts: goals (objectives or purposes of the systems); functions 
(means to obtain the goals); and physical components (equipment to build the system) 
[48]. 
 Gofuku [49] mentioned that by changing the abstraction level, it will make it 
easier to deal with a complicated system such as nuclear power plants for designing 
and managing the abnormal situation of the system. MFM has been implemented, for 
example, for operator support system in supervisory control [50, 51] and dynamic 
operation permission system [24, 52]. In addition, MFM can be used to express the 
information related to the plant condition in linguistic form. This functional 
information is very important for supporting the operators conducting their tasks to 
monitor and control the plant.  
MFM is a method to represent complex industrial system in term of functions and 
objectives and the interconnection among them in high level of abstraction. Unlike 
other object-oriented modeling, MFM offers some benefits. In other object-oriented 
modeling (such as UML or hierarchical colored Petri-net), as mentioned in [53], the 
validity of diagnosis result is the main focus and do not reveal the diagnosis process 
to the operators. It means that operators do not understand what happened in a 
diagnostic system based on other-oriented modeling techniques. On the other hand, 
MFM provides comprehensive diagnosis based on perspective of human on the 
objective of the system. MFM breaks down the system into means-ends and whole-
part dimension. In the means-ends dimension, MFM depicts the relationships among 
functions to achieve the system objective. On the other hand, the system is described 
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in different levels of aggregation in whole-part dimension. In addition, MFM provide 
realization relation which corresponds physical components with their functions, for 
example, function of transporting water can be realized by a pump. Furthermore, 
another important aspect of MFM is its ability to conduct consequence reasoning 
which is very useful for assessing the plant situation and system performance. The 
consequence reasoning is based on influence propagation, which indicates that the 
change of state of a function or objective will change the state of other neighboring 
functions or objectives (downstream connections). Regarding this study, the 
consequence reasoning and influence propagation are very useful to comprehensively 
gather the proposed additional information (components influenced and future plant 
behavior).  
 
3.2. MFM Symbols 
Figure 3.2-1 shows the MFM symbols used for constructing an MFM model. The 
symbols consist of functions primitives (such as source, transport and storage) and 
relations (influence, means-end and control). The function primitives correlate with 
the plant components. For example, a transport function is correlated with a pipe and 
a tank is represented by a storage function. An MFM model generally consists of mass 
flow structures, energy flow structures, control structures and objectives.  
Each function primitive is connected by influence relations (influencers or 
participants). The influencer means that the relation influence the amount of material 
delivered by a transport function connected to a flow function (source, sink, storage 
or balance). If the transport function is passively provided or received material from 
the flow function, it is said that the relation is participant. Moreover, other relations 
are means-end relations which connect flow structures with objectives (produce, 
maintain, destroy and suppress) or connect function primitives with flow structures 
(produce-product and mediate). The flow sturctures or functions represent means to 
achieve objectives (end).  
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Figure 3.2-1. MFM symbols 
 
3.3. MFM Reasoning 
As mentioned in previous section that MFM is a tool to represent the complex 
industrial plants in block of symbols that correlated with functions and goals. In 
addition, it is also a tool to analyze and reason about the system performance based 
on relations between states of functions and objectives. Cause-effect relations are 
used to conduct reasoning in MFM. Owing to the fact that MFM decomposes a 
complex system in means-ends and whole part dimensions, the cause-effect in both 
dimensions has to be considered [54]. Therefore, there are two patterns related with 
the cause-effect relations involving “goal to function” and “function to function” in 
MFM models: influence relation and means-end relations [45]. 
 
Influence relations 
The flow structures are constructed by the interconnected function primitives. The 
interconnections also created the cause-effect relations between states of function 
primitives. The relations are called influence relations.  There are two types of 
influence relations: direct influences and indirect influences. As mentioned before 
that the cause-effect relations are based on the states of the function primitives, the 
state of the function primitives in the MFM model should be defined as provided in 
Table 3.3-1.  
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The definition of the states of MFM is based on [55]. However, in this thesis, 
some modifications have been proposed in order to cover some conditions in real 
plants. Such modification, for example, is to treat “no flow” in “transport” function 
primitive, which indicates that there is no mass/energy transferred from one 
component to another component. The underlined states indicate the modified parts 
of the definition. The “no volume” state is additionally defined to treat no liquid mass 
condition of a tank-type component. 
 
Table 3.3-1. Definition of state of MFM 
Symbols States 
source normal, high output flow potential, low output flow potential, 
no output flow potential 
sink normal, high input flow, low input flow, no input flow 
transport normal, high flow, low flow, no flow 
storage normal, high volume, low volume, no volume 
barrier normal, leak 
balance Normal (balance), unbalance (fill or leak) 
threat exist (high), exist (low), non-exist 
objective true (high), true (low), false 
 
In direct influences, the influence is indicated by how transport functions 
influence other function primitives. The function primitives connected to a transport 
function in the mass or energy flow will be influenced by the state of the transport 
function in both its upstream and downstream directions [54]. On the other hand, if 
the transport function is influenced by other function primitives, it is called indirect 
influences [54]. The influencer and participants connections impact the influence in 
the indirect influence but not in the direct influence. Literature [55, 57, 46] describe 
the detail about the formulas for direct influence and indirect influence and some 
examples are provided in this thesis. The examples of rule for direct influence for 
both upstream and downstream connections, adopted from [56] are provided in Table 
3.3-2. On the other hand, the rule for indirect influence is different between with 
influencer relations and participant relations, as can be seen in Table 3.3-3 and Table 
3.3-4, respectively. 
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Table 3.3-2 Direct influence for upstream and downstream connections [56] 
Inference upstream 
Cause Consequence 
 
tra2-4: high flow sou1-2: low output flow potential 
sto2-3: low volume 
tra2-4: low flow sou1-2: high output flow potential 
sto2-3: high volume 
Inference downstream 
Cause Consequence  
tra6-9: high flow sto4-5: high volume 
sin1-2: high input flow 
tra6-9: low flow sto4-5: low volume 
sin1-2: low input flow 
 
Table 3.3-3 Indirect influence with influencer relations [56] 
Inference upstream 
Cause Consequence  
sto6: high volume 
sin3: high input flow 
tra10, tra11: low flow 
sto6: low volume 
sin3: low input flow 
tra10, tra11: high flow 
Inference downstream 
Cause Consequence  
sou3: high output flow potential 
sto7: high volume 
tra12, tra13: high flow 
sou3: low output flow potential 
sto7: low volume 
tra12, tra13: low flow 
 
Table 3.3-4 Indirect influence with participant relations [56] 
Inference upstream 
Cause Consequence  
sto8: high volume 
sin4: high input flow 
tra14, tra15: low flow 
sto8: low volume 
sin4: low input flow 
N/A 
Inference downstream 
Cause Consequence  
 
sou4: high output flow potential 
sto9: high volume 
N/A 
sou4: high output flow potential 
sto9: high volume 
tra16, tra17: low flow 
 
Means-end relations 
There are two types of means-end relations. First is the connection between flow 
structures and objectives. It is connected with the produce, maintain, destroy or 
suppress relations. Second is the connection between function primitives and flow 
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structures using producer-product and mediate relations. The means-end relations 
also contribute to the cause-effect relations between states of function primitives and 
objectives. The examples of rules of means-end relations is given in Table 3.3-5. It 
can be seen that, for example, if the objective obj1 is true (high state) then the 
transport function tra1 will in high flow condition. 
 
Table 3.3-5 Rules of means-end relations 
Patterns Cause Consequence 
 
sou1 tra1 
High output flow 
potential 
High Flow 
Low output flow 
potential 
Low Flow 
 
obj1 tra1 
True (high) High Flow 
True (low) Low Flow 
false Not function 
 
tra1 tra2 
High Flow High Flow 
Low Flow Low Flow 
 
 
3.4. Influence Propagation 
The concept of cause-effect relation is implemented in MFM. The usage of 
cause-effect concept was proposed by the study to generate plausible counter 
operations based on MFM models created by the past symbol set [12]. Because this 
study uses current symbol set of MFM, the rules of influence propagation proposed 
in the literature [56] are used, there are two types of cause-effect relations: direct and 
indirect influence. In a direct influence, the state change of a function primitive, for 
example, transport function will cause state changes of neighboring functions 
connected to the transport function. On the other hand, in an indirect influence, the 
state change of a function primitive is caused by other functions. The concept is the 
33 
 
basis for influence propagation rules. Figure 3.4-1 depicts the influence propagation 
in an MFM model. 
 
Figure 3.4-1 Influence propagation 
 
First of all, in step 1, an operational action on a component will change the state 
of the function primitives that is realized by the component. The state change in 
qualitative level is given by an operation knowledge that correlates an action of a 
component with a state change of the function realized by the component. An example 
of the operation knowledge is that closing a valve changes the state of correlated 
transport function from “normal” to “no flow.” The state change then influences the 
downward function primitives in the function structure that the function primitives 
belong to (step 2). Moreover, by using the knowledge that correlates a function flow 
with an objective (step 3), the change of function state will influence the objective 
connected to the function by a means-end relation in Figure 3.4-1. On the other hand, 
the objective is also connected to a function by a control relation. The state change of 
the objective will influence the state of the function. Then, the state change influences 
the states of all related function primitives (step 4). Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the change of the state of the function primitive correlated with the component 
that a counter action (by automatic system or human operators) is made will influence 
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the states of function primitives, objectives and then propagates the influence in some 
parts of system. 
As an example of the influence propagation rules, an MFM model of tank process 
is used, in which the model is similar to the MFM model in Figure 3.4-1. In this case, 
efs1 represents the energy flow in the pump and obj1 is the objective to keep the pump 
running. The water flow in the tank is represented by mfs1, while the main objective 
to maintain the correct water level in the tank is represented by obj2. Initially, all of 
states of function primitives is in a normal condition and the objectives are enabled. 
In order to describe the influence propagation rules, let no electrical energy supplied 
to the pump. It is indicated by no output flow potential in sou1 (operation knowledge). 
The state change of sou1 will influence the downstream connections, tra5 to change 
from normal flow to no flow. Because there is no energy flow in the pump, the 
objective obj1 “to keep the pump running” cannot be achieved. The failure of 
achievement of obj1 will disable the tra1 (pump) and change the state from normal 
flow to no flow. It means that there is no water flow from the pump. This condition 
then change the state of all downstream connections from normal to no flow. The state 
change finally influences the input flow of sto2 to no input flow. It indicates that the 
tank is not filled with the water which cause the objective obj2 “to keep the level in 
the tank” is not achieved 
 
3.5. Modeling of a Counteraction by MFM Control Function 
Operator’s action or a counteraction conducted by human is a manual 
intervention to the system based on the knowledge, conditions or predefined values 
to change the state of a component in order to achieve an objective of changing the 
plant state in a safer one and/or of mitigating influence of an anomaly. The effort of 
operators to mitigate the accident by executing the instruction in the EOP, for example, 
operating the auxiliary feedwater system to regulate the level of faulted and intact SG 
after determining and isolating the ruptured SG can be categorized as a counteraction. 
The concept of counter action is relevant with the concept of control function in the 
MFM. Therefore, the control function in MFM is used to model the operator’s actions.  
The control functions of MFM are applied in this study to model the counter 
actions on an EOP. Control function is proposed by Lind [44, 57] and has been 
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implemented in some studies [46, 58]. There are several types of control functions 
[44] in MFM as can be seen in Table 3.5-1.  
 
Table 3.5-1 MFM control functions 
Task Symbol Purpose 
Steering 
 
Ensure that p is produced 
Regulation 
 
Ensure that p is maintained 
Tripping 
 
Ensure that ~p is produced 
Interlock 
 
Ensure that ~p is maintained 
 
Counter actions represent the actions which change something from one plant 
condition to another condition. Because a counter action will change state or create a 
new state of a function primitive, the basic control function for modeling the counter 
actions is the steering (producing) control function.  
Following the idea proposed in [44], the model of operator’s action is represented 
in Figure 3.5-1. In the figure, only the relevant function primitives in mass flow 
structure mfs1 are shown. The explanations of the control function are as follows. The 
conditional operation of the control function is to change the state of the storage 
function sto1, for example from low volume to high volume. The conditional 
operation is connected to the objective function obj1 using produce relation (pr1).  
 
 
Figure 3.5-1. MFM control function 
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Therefore, the objective of the system is to change the state of the sto1. If the 
sto1 represents the tank, then the objective is to change the volume of the tank. Based 
on the conditional operation and the objective, the control function pco1 is activated 
(in1) and then change the state of transport function tra1 in mfs1 indicated by the 
actuation relation (ac1).  If the all the conditions are satisfied, the control objective 
(cobj1) which is connected to mfs1 using maintain relation (ma1) is achieved.  
In case of modeling the counter actions of EOP, the objective and the conditional 
operation is represented by the purpose of the procedure step. In Figure 3.5-1 it is 
represented by the intended state of sto1. The counter action or the human action is 
represented by the control function pco1 and the component or function to be 
controlled is the transport function tra1. If it is intended that the volume of the sto1 is 
high, then the transport function tra1 should be controlled or the state should be 
changed from low flow to high flow. 
 
3.6. Algorithms to Derive the Additional Information 
Additional information is information related with the impact of an automatic 
system operation and human action is very important and the information can help 
operators to understand and follow the procedure steps. This section proposes the 
algorithms to generate the additional information: component influenced and future 
plant behavior. The algorithms apply the influence propagation described in the 
previous section based on an MFM model. 
 
3.6.1. Components influenced 
Figure 3.6-1 shows the algorithm to generate the information of components 
influenced n as a consequence of a counter action (automatic or human action) 
following the instructions of an EOP. Followings are the explanation of the algorithm. 
As described in section 3.5, the counter action is represented by control function in 
MFM model. Each operation in an EOP is in advance correlated with a control 
function structure. The correlation is made by “operation condition”. The operation 
condition is composed of the name of operation, control flow function corresponding 
to the operation, and state modifier to express the change of the state of the function 
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primitive that is controlled by the operation. As an example, consider the process of 
increasing the volume of water in a tank. In this case, the operation condition and 
system objective are to increase the level of water in the tank (“tank”, “high volume”). 
Based on the operation condition, the control function is actuated to start the pump 
and open the valve which allow water to flow and fill in the tank.  
  
 
Figure 3.6-1. Algorithm to derive components influenced information 
 
The next step is to propagate the state change of downward function 
primitives in the function flow structures that include the affected function 
primitive using influence propagation. If there is a relation with other function 
flow structures by “means-end relations”, the influence is propagated to the 
function flow structures. In addition, the influence also impacts the objective 
connected to the flow structure. If all the influences have been investigated, the 
results of the influence propagation can be expressed by using “explanation 
sentences” which describe the state change of function primitives (function 
components) and the state change of physical components (realized components).  
The realized components are identified using “realization relations” that correlate 
functions primitives with the physical components. The “realization relations” 
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contain a list of function primitives and their correlations with physical 
components and related mass or energy flow structure, using the following format: 
 
realization relation: (“function primitive”; “physical component”; “mass/energy”; 
“object name”) 
 
For example, a storage function (sto) is correlated with a tank and water stored in 
the tank. In this case, the realization relation can be expressed as (“sto”; “tank”; 
“mass”; “water”). 
 
3.6.2. Future plant behavior 
The counter action (automatic or human action), as mentioned in the 
previous section, impacts the conditions of system components. Consequently, 
the future plant behavior is also changes because of the operation actions. By 
the use of an MFM model, the plant behavior can be correlated with the 
achievement of function objectives or the change of the states of function 
primitives in a system. Information about future plant behavior is also important 
for operators to understand the consequence of procedure steps. 
The algorithm to derive the future plant behavior is provided in Figure 3.6-
2. To begin with, the first five steps are similar with the algorithm for deriving 
the components influenced (Figure 3.6-1). Therefore, the explanation sentences 
made by the algorithm to derive the components influenced are partially used by 
this algorithm.  
The next step is to select and collect one main explanation sentence for 
each component from the explanation sentences for the component considering 
the main function. Main function means a system or a component which is 
important for safety and should be considered by operators. 
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Figure 3.6-2. Algorithm to derive future plant behavior information 
 
3.7. Explanation Sentences 
MFM is useful tool for investigation of cause-effect relation of influence of 
counter actions to derive the functional information. The functional information 
should be presented to operators in understandable way. It can be expressed using 
explanation sentences. The explanation sentences are derived based on the algorithms 
proposed in the previous section. The explanation sentences are generated for 
component influenced and future plant behavior. 
 
3.7.1.  Components influenced 
The explanation sentences can be generated using the following pattern: 
(a) Function primitives 
(state of function primitive) + “of” + “mass/energy” + “in” + (function 
primitive) 
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(b) Realizing components of function primitives 
(state of function primitive) + “of” + (object name of mass/energy) + “in” + 
(physical component) 
 
In the pattern, “mass” is used if the function primitive is included in a mass flow 
structure, and “energy” is used if it is included in an energy flow structure. The 
converted explanation sentences are sometimes not natural English expressions 
due to the simple conversion technique. However, an operator will understand 
the meaning.  
Finally, from the explanation sentences of pattern (b), the influenced 
components are selected and collected. The “main components” database is 
provided for selecting and collecting the influenced components from the 
explanation sentences. If the influenced components are in the list of “main 
components” database, they are set as components influenced and written using 
following format:  
The components influenced: (“influenced physical components”) 
 
3.7.2.  Future plant behavior 
Regarding the future plant behavior, the explanation sentence is made by 
setting suitable terms that represent the plant behavior to the parts of the 
following sentence pattern: 
 
(state of function primitive) + “of” + (object name of mass/energy) + “in” + 
(physical component) 
 
Furthermore, special technical terms expressing plant behavior, which are 
derived from operational procedures or accident management, such as safety 
injection (SI), reactor trip, etc. are also stored in a database called “specific term” 
database that correlates a term with the state of function primitive. For example, 
the specific term “hot shutdown” can be given for some plant behavior such as 
reactor trip (no flow of heat in reactor vessel), turbine trip (no flow of 
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mechanical energy in turbine) and generator trip (no flow of electrical energy in 
generator), and so on. Finally, based on the algorithm in Figure 3.6-2., if some 
state changes of influenced components are matched with the “specific term” 
database, then the future plant behavior is expressed in specific technical term. 
Otherwise, if they are not matched, the future plant behavior is expressed using 
the selected sentences for components. 
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Chapter 4 
4. Modeling of PWR Plant and Emergency Operating Procedure 
4.1. Outline of PWR Plant 
This chapter describes the overview of PWR structure diagram and the MFM 
model of the PWR plant. Then, the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident of 
a PWR plant is considered as a case study in this study. Operators should mitigate the 
accident following the emergency operating procedure in step by step. 
In this study, a simplified diagram of pressurized water reactor (PWR) plant is 
used, as can be seen in Figure 4.1-1 [59]. A PWR system has primary system and 
secondary system. Primary system transfers heat generated in the fuel and stored in 
reactor vessel to the steam generator. The steam generator produces steam and then 
the steam is introduced to turbine to rotate the electric generator. The mechanical 
energy to rotate is in turn converted to electricity (electrical energy). The steam that 
some heat energy is lost will be delivered to the condenser and condensed into water 
and then transferred to the steam generator. 
 
 
Figure 4.1-1. Simplified diagram of PWR plant 
 
A PWR also has safety systems which will be functioned in case of emergency. 
When an anomaly happens in the plant, the reactor will be automatically shut down 
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by the reactor trip and the safety injection signal is actuated to operate the emergency 
core cooling system (ECCS) to provide water to the reactor coolant system (RCS). 
Although the reactor is shutdown, it still produces decay heat. The decay heat should 
be removed to cooldown the reactor by bypassing the turbine and dumping the steam 
to the condenser. The cooldown process then is completed by the residual heat 
removal system. 
 
4.2. MFM Model of PWR Plant 
In order to investigate how the MFM can model the counter actions on an EOP, a 
simple MFM model of a PWR plant based on the PWR diagram in Figure 4.1-1 is 
constructed, as provided in Figure 4.2-1.  
 
 
Figure 4.2-1. MFM model of simplified of PWR plant 
 
This model is a modification of the MFM model developed by [59]. The MFM model 
includes major PWR systems (primary system by mass flow structure mfs1 and 
secondary system by mfs2) and safety systems such as emergency core cooling 
system (efs9), residual heat removal system (sto1) and internal spray system (sto2). 
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Table 4.2-1 describes some main flow structures, functions and objectives which will 
be discussed in this paper. 
The main objective (obj1) of the MFM model of the PWR system is to generate 
the electricity. It can be accomplished by converting the heat energy into electrical 
energy. Initially the heat is generated in fuel (sou3 in efs1) installed in reactor vessel 
(sto3 in mfs1) and by fission reaction (represented by the energy flow structure efs1). 
The heat is transferred from primary system to secondary structure (efs7) through the 
steam generator bal14 (primary side) and sin3 (secondary side). Furthermore, the 
heat is converted into mechanical energy in efs6 to rotate the turbine and generator 
(efs8). Finally, the electrical energy is produced (obj1).  
 
Table 4.2-1. Description of main functions and objectives 
Main flow structures  Main functions 
Symbols Description  Symbol Description 
mfs1 Primary system  sto3 Reactor vessel 
mfs2 Secondary system  tra9 Heat transfer 
efs1 Heat production  sto5 Pressurizer 
efs7 Heat transfer from primary to secondary 
system of SG 
 bal7 SG primary side 
efs6 Conversion from heat to mechanical energy  tra5 RCP 
efs8 Conversion from mechanical to electrical 
energy 
 sto4 SG secondary side 
efs9 ECCS  sou16 & bar10 Safety injection 
efs11 CVCS  sto2 Containment spray 
exchanger 
efs3 RCP  bar8 Containment spray valve 
mfs4 Pressurizer heater  sto1 Residual heat exchanger 
es13 PORV  sou2 Raw water tank 
efs14 Pressurizer spray  tra15 MSIV 
efs10 Feedwater pump  tra16 Main steam stop valve 
efs5 Condenser  sto6 turbine 
efs2 MSIV  sto7 condenser 
efs4 Containment spray valve    
efs12 Containment spray exchanger  Objectives 
mfs3 Control rods  Symbol description 
   obj1 Electricity production 
   obj2 Pumping primary coolant 
   obj3 Provide feedwater 
   obj4 Maintain cooling the 
reactor 
   obj10 Maintain subcooling 
 
4.3. Modeling of EOP of SGTR 
As a case study, a typical accident of PWR plant caused by a steam generator tube 
rupture (SGTR) is applied to the MFM model of PWR plant. Some counter actions 
should be conducted to mitigate the accident step by step following the instruction of 
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EOP of SGTR. In this case, a simplified EOP of SGTR accident of Mihama Unit 2 
[6] is used. Table 4.3-1 shows the steps of the EOP. The reason for choosing the SGTR 
accident is because it is one of common and potential accident in PWR plants and 
there are some operator actions depending on the plant conditions. The common 
causes of the SGTR accident are the degradation and ageing process and also stress 
corrosion cracking [60]. The SGTR accident should be mitigated following some 
safety functions: reactor trip, core cooling, steam generator overfills prevention and 
steam generator isolation. 
 
Table 4.3-1. Simplified of EOP of SGTR [6]  
Steps Descriptions 
STEP 1 Occurrence of SGTR thereafter reactor trip and SI 
STEP 2 Check RCP restart criteria, if not meet, trip all RCPs, otherwise go to STEP 3 
STEP 3 Identification and isolation of faulted steam generator 
STEP 4 Regulate the level of faulted steam generator (8% - 50% of narrow range) 
STEP 5 Regulate the level of intact steam generator (8% - 10% of narrow range) 
STEP 6 Reset SI signal 
STEP 7 Recover power of all AC Power 
STEP 8 RCS cooldown using steam dump through SG PORV or steam dump valve 
STEP 9 Check availability of PZR normal spray 
Start PZR normal spray, if available. 
If NOT available, open PZR PORV or use PZR auxiliary spray 
STEP 10 Check RCS pressure less than faulted SG pressure and PZR level more than 
8%. If NOT, go to STEP 9 
STEP 11 Check cease of SI 
STEP 12 Regulate PZR level between 50% and 75% using charging flow 
STEP 13 Make PZR water saturated by heater 
STEP 14 Operate only one RCP 
STEP 15 Start RCS depressurization 
STEP 16 STOP 
 
The SGTR accident is indicated by the decreasing of pressurizer level and 
pressure, increasing the level of steam generator, and increasing radiation in main 
steam line. The safety system will trip the reactor to stop the heat production and 
safety injection system is actuated to provide the cooling to the reactor coolant system. 
The next steps are the rupture SG should be identified and isolated in order to prevent 
the release of radioactive material to the environment through the ruptured SG and 
turbine. Moreover, although the reactor is shutdown, the residual heat remains in the 
system. Therefore, it should be removed by cooling down the reactor cooling system 
by steam dump through SG power operated relief valve (PORV) in case of the 
condenser is not available or through steam dump valve directly to the condenser. As 
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the RCS is cooled down and the core temperature is decreased to a certain value, the 
RCS should be decreased until the pressure remains stable and the safety injection can 
be stopped. Consequently, one reactor coolant pump can be operated to cool the core 
and then the RCS can be depressurized by reverse leak through break, blowdown 
through faulted SG or steam dump. 
This section discusses the modeling of EOP by using MFM model of PWR plant 
including operator actions for SGTR accident. Some procedure steps of simplified of 
EOP of SGTR in Table 4.3-1 will be discussed. Each counter action in procedure step 
is represented by an MFM control structure following the idea of Figure 3.5-1 in 
Section 3.5. 
 
4.3.1. STEP 1: Occurrence of SGTR thereafter reactor trip and safety injection 
The reactor trip and safety injection are actuated automatically by safety 
system when anomalies happen in the plant which cause the decrease of the level 
of pressurizer. Figure 4.3-1 shows the modeling of counter actions of reactor trip 
and safety injection. As can be seen in the figure that there are MFM control 
functions which represent the counter actions (cfs1: reactor trip, cfs2: safety 
injection, cfs3: stopping RCP). The action of stopping RCS is caused by the safety 
injection. Therefore, the discussion of safety injection is together with the 
stopping RCS. 
 
Reactor trip 
Reactor trip occurs due to the low pressurizer pressure level and automatically 
trips the turbine and main feedwater system. It will decrease core power to decay 
heat levels, terminate the steam flowing through the turbine and actuate the steam 
dump (turbine bypass). During the accident, the reactor trip is automatically done 
by the safety system. Reactor trip is realized by the insertion of control rods to the 
reactor core. The control rods will absorb neutron for producing fission reaction 
and stop heat production in the reactor core. 
In the MFM model, the reactor trip operation is represented by a control 
structure cfs1. The operation condition is the low level of pressurizer pressure 
47 
 
(low volume of sto5), which is connected to the objective of the system obj1 to 
shut down the reactor. Based on this condition, the control function pco1 will be 
actuated to change the state of tra41 in mfs3 (control rods) in high flow. Table 
4.3-2 provides the parameters of modeling the counter action for the reactor trip 
operation. 
 
 
Figure 4.3-1. MFM model of counter actions of reactor trip and safety injection 
 
Table 4.3-2. Parameters of modeling of counter actions for reactor trip 
Reactor trip 
Items Physical components MFM model 
Operation condition Low pressurizer level Low volume of sto5 
Objective To shut down the reactor and to stop the 
heat production in the reactor vessel 
obj1 
Control function Insert the control rods pco1, high flow of tra41 
Controlled component Control rods tra41 
Control objective To insert control rods into the fuel rods cobj1 
 
Safety injection and stopping the RCP 
In the MFM model, the safety injection is represented by control structure 
cfs2, as can be seen in Fig 4.3-1. The purpose of the control structure cobj2 is to 
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start ECCS (efs8). The control function pco2 will actuate the electric power 
(sou12) in the ECCS if the level of pressurizer (sto5) is low.  
Furthermore, the safety injection also causes the RCP stop to operate. In the 
MFM model in Figure 4.3-1, a system to control the RCP is represented by the 
control structure cfs3. As the cause of stopping the RCP is the safety injection 
which is based on the pressurizer level, therefore it can be considered that the 
operation condition for stopping the RCS is the low volume of sto5. Consequently, 
the pco3 will change the state of sou5 from normal to no output flow potential.  
Table 4.3-3 summarizes the parameters of the modeling counter actions for safety 
injection and stopping RCP. 
 
Table 4.3-3. Parameters of modeling of safety injection and stopping RCP operation 
Safety injection operation 
Items Physical components MFM model 
Operation condition Low level of pressurizer Low volume of sto5 
Objective To provide water to the RCS obj7 
Control function To start the ECCS pco2: set the state of sou12 to 
high output flow potential 
Controlled component ECCS pump sou12 in efs9 
Control objective To start the ECCS cobj2 
Stopping RCP operation 
Items Physical components MFM model 
Operation condition Low level of pressurizer Low volume of sto5 
Objective Stop provide cooling to the RCS obj11 
Control function Stop the RCP operation pco3: set the state of sou5 to 
no output flow potential 
Controlled component RCP sou5 
Control objective To stop the RCP operation cobj3 
 
 
4.3.2. STEP 2: Check RCP restart criteria, if not meet, trip all RCPs, otherwise 
go to STEP 3 
As mentioned in the previous section, after safety injection, the RCP is 
stopped. In order to maintain the cooling of the RCS, it is important to check 
whether the RCP should be restarted or not. The RCP is restarted if the pressurizer 
level and sub-cooling of the RCS are more than predefined value [6]. Because 
MFM is a tool for qualitative analysis, the criteria will be considered as high (more 
than a predefined value) or low (less than a predefined value). In this paper, only 
49 
 
the pressurizer level is assumed to be used. There are two possible results related 
with the counter action. The RCP is not restarted (OFF) when the pressurizer level 
is “low”. On the other hand, if the pressure level is “high”, the RCP should be 
restarted (ON). 
 
 
Figure 4.3-2. MFM model of RCP restart criteria operation 
 
Figure 4.3-2 shows the MFM model of checking the RCP restart criteria. the 
counter action is represented by the control function cfs4. In addition, Table 4.3-
4 provides the parameters for modeling the counter action. The operation 
condition is the state of sto5 (pressurizer) and correlated with the obj12 to actuate 
control function pco4 in cfs4 to change the state of sou5 in efs3 (RCP) 
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Table 4.3-4. Parameters of modeling of check RCP restart criteria operation 
Check RCP restart criteria 
Items Physical components MFM model 
Operation condition Pressurizer level Low or high volume of 
mass in sto5 
Objective Provide water to the RCS from the RCP or 
do nothing 
obj12 
Control function Start or stop the RCP pco4: if sto5 (high), set 
the state of sou5 to high 
output flow potential 
pco4: if sto5 (low), do 
nothing 
Controlled component RCP sou5 
Control objective To start or remain stop the RCP cobj4 
 
4.3.3.  Identification and isolation of faulted steam generator 
The next step of mitigation of the SGTR accident is identification the 
ruptured steam generator (SG). The ruptured SG can be identified by the level of 
SG, the level difference among SGs and radiation monitoring in SG blowdown 
line. Afterwards, the ruptured SG should be isolated. The isolation of ruptured SG 
operation is intended to depressurize the primary and secondary system to 
minimize the leakage from primary to secondary and to ensure the integrity of the 
core and primary system, and to prevent the release of radioactive material 
through the turbine. The ruptured SG is isolated by closing the main steam 
isolation valve (MSIV). 
The MFM model related with the isolating ruptured SG operation is shown 
in Figure 4.3-3. The isolation of ruptured SG is represented by the control flow 
structure cfs5 and control function pco5. In this case, the “low volume” in sto6 is 
the operation condition which represents the “low” or “no” volume of steam that 
contains radioactive material in the turbine (objective of the system).  Based on 
the causal reasoning of MFM, in order to make the low (no) volume in sto6, the 
transport function tra15 should be in low (no) flow. Therefore, the pco5 is actuated 
to change the state of tra16 from normal (high) flow to low (no) flow.  The 
parameters of modeling of the isolation of ruptured SG is summarized in Table 
4.3-5. 
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Figure 4.3-3. MFM model isolation of ruptured SG operation 
 
Table 4.3-5. Parameters of modeling of isolation of ruptured SG operation 
Isolation of ruptured SG 
Items Physical components MFM model 
Operation condition Low (no) volume of steam in the 
turbine 
Low (no) volume in sto6 
Objective To isolate the ruptured SG obj13 
Control function To close the MSIV pco5: set the state of tra15 to no 
flow 
Controlled component MSIV tra15 
Control objective To close the MSIV to stop steam 
flowing to the turbine 
cobj5 
 
4.3.4. RCS cooldown using steam dump through SG PORV or steam dump valve 
This step is executed after the level of faulted/intact SG has been regulated 
to the set point value and the safety injection (SI) has been stopped. The RCS is 
cooled down using steam dump through SG PORV if the condenser is not 
available. Otherwise, if the condenser is available, the steam dump valve is used 
to dump the steam. This thesis only discusses the RCS cooling down using steam 
dump through the steam dump valve. Figure 4.3-4 shows the MFM model of 
counter action. The counter action is modeled by the control structure cfs7 and the 
parameters are provided in Table 4.3-6. 
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Figure 4.3-4. MFM model of RCS cooldown using steam dump valve operation 
 
Table 4.3-6. Parameters of modeling the RCS cooldown operation 
Regulate of SG level 
Items Physical components MFM model 
Operation condition Low temperature of RCS Low volume of sto10 in efs15 
Objective To decrease the temperature of RCS obj15 
Control function Open the steam dump valve pco7: disable the bar11 
Controlled component Steam dump valve bar11 
Control objective To open the steam dump valve cobj7 
 
After the reactor trip and safety injection operation, the reactor is in hot 
shutdown condition. It means that the residual heat remains in the system and 
should be removed by dumping the steam from the SG in order to cooldown the 
RCS. In case of the condenser is available, the steam can be dumped by bypassing 
the turbine and opening the steam dump valve to let the steam directly flowing to 
the condenser. In Figure 4.3-4, the temperature level of the RCS is represented by 
the state of sto10 in efs15 (energy flow of RCS). Therefore, the operation 
condition is the low volume of sto10 which is correlated with the obj15, which in 
turn actuate the control function pco7 to disable the barrier function bar11. If the 
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barrier function is disabled, it means that the mass or energy can be transferred 
through the function. Therefore, it can be considered that the barrier function acts 
as a transport function 
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Chapter 5 
5. Application Results and Discussions of Deriving Additional 
Information 
The algorithms to derive the additional information and the explanation sentences 
described in the Chapter 3 are applied to the counter actions of executing procedure 
step of EOP to mitigate the SGTR accident of the MFM model of a PWR plant. 
Some investigations also have been conducted by the author in [62, 63, 64]. The 
derivation results for some procedure steps will be discussed including automatic 
actions and operator actions in this chapter. 
 
5.1. Reactor trip and safety injection 
Figure 5.1-1 shows the related part of MFM model with reactor trip 
operation. The counter action is modeled by the control structure cfs1 with the 
operation condition is the low volume of mass in sto5. Then, the reactor trip 
controller (pco1) changes the state of tra41 in mfs3 from no flow to high flow, 
which in turn, following the cause-effect relation and influence propagation, the 
high flow of tra41 causes “no output flow potential” in sou3 in efs1 that 
corresponds to no heat generation in reactor core region. Then, based on the 
influence propagation, there is no energy flow through tra18 to sin5 in efs1. 
Moreover, the influence propagated to efs7 changes the state of sou10 to “low/no 
output flow potential” and to “low/no flow” in tra29. Consequently, the efs6 has 
no energy flow because of “no output flow potential” in sou9 and “no flow” in 
tra28. The final influence is, because there are “no flow” in tra28 and “no output 
flow potential” in sou11, the conversion function cnv1 will not be enabled. 
Therefore, the objective obj1 to produce electricity to the grid will not be achieved. 
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Figure 5.1-1. Part of MFM model related with reactor trip 
 
Table 5.1-1. States of function primitives before and after the reactor trip operation 
Counter action Initial state After counter action 
Reactor trip Tra41 (no flow), sou3 (normal), tra18 
(normal), sou10 (normal), tra29 
(normal), sou9 (normal), tra28 (normal), 
sou11 (normal), cnv1 (enable), obj1 
(true) 
tra41 (high flow), sou3 (no output flow potential), 
tra18 (no flow), sou10 (no output flow potential), 
tra29 (no output flow potential), sou9 (no output 
flow potential), tra28 (no flow), sou11 (no output 
flow potential), cnv1 (disable), obj1 (false) 
 
 
Table 5.1-2. Explanation sentences for the influences of reactor trip operation 
Functions Functional components Realizing components 
tra41 in mfs3 High flow of mass in tra41 High flow of control rods in Reactivity control 
system 
sou3 in efs1
  
Low (No) flow output potential of energy in efs1 Low (No) flow output potential of heat in Fuel 
rods 
tra18 in efs1 Low (no) flow of energy in tra18 Low (no) flow of heat in Reactor vessel 
sin5 in efs1 Low (No) flow input of energy in sin5 Low (No) flow of heat in Reactor vessel 
sou10 in efs7 Low (No) flow output potential of energy in 
sou10 
Low (No) flow output potential of steam in SG 
tra28 in efs7 Low (No) flow of energy in tra28 Low (No) flow of heat of water in primary side 
of SG 
bal14 in efs7  Balance of energy in bal14 Balance of heat in SG tube 
tra29 in efs7 Low (No) flow of energy in tra29 Low (No) flow of heat of steam in secondary 
side of SG 
sin13 in efs7 Low (No) flow input of energy in sin13 Low (No) flow input of heat of steam in 
secondary side of SG 
sou9 in efs6 Low (No) flow output potential of energy in sou9 Low (No) flow output potential of heat of steam 
in Turbine 
tra25 in efs6 Low (No) flow of energy in tra25 Low (No) flow of heat of steam in Turbine 
bal13 in efs6 Balance of energy in bal13 Balance of heat in Turbine 
tra26 in efs6 Low (No) flow of energy in tra26  Low (No) flow of mechanical energy in Turbine 
sin11 in efs6 Low (No) flow input of energy in efs6 Low (No) flow input of mechanical energy in 
Turbine 
sou11 in efs8 Low (No) flow output potential of energy in efs8 Low (No) flow output potential of mechanical 
energy in Generator 
tra30 in efs8 Low (No) flow of energy in tra30 Low (No) flow of mechanical energy in 
Generator  
cnv1 in efs8 Low (No) energy conversion of energy in cnv1 Low (No) flow of energy in Generator 
tra31 in efs8 Low (No) flow of energy in tra31 Low (No) flow of electrical energy in Generator 
sin14 in efs8
  
Low (No) flow input of energy in sin14 
 
Low (No) flow of electrical energy in Electric 
grid 
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The change of states of function primitives caused by the reactor trip 
operation and the influence propagation is given in Table 5.1-1. The influence 
propagation due to the reactor trip operation can be expressed using explanation 
sentences as shown in Table 5.1-2. The explanation sentences are derived based 
on the “realization relation” database and the pattern described in Subsection 3.7.1. 
The “realization relation” contains data of function primitives and the correlated 
components as mentioned in Table 4.2-1, such as mfs3 represents the control rods; 
and the heat transfer from primary to secondary system of steam generator is 
represented by efs7. Therefore, from Table 5.1-2, it can be concluded that the 
components influenced by the reactor trip operation are control rods, reactor 
vessel, steam generator, turbine, generator and electric grid. If it is expressed in 
components influenced sentence, it becomes: 
 
The components influenced: “Control rods, Reactor vessel, Steam generator, 
Turbine, Generator, Electric grid”. 
 
Moreover, the future plant behavior after the reactor trip operation can be 
determined using the algorithm described in Subsection 3.7.2 and from the 
explanation sentences in Table 5.1-2. In this case, the information is selected and 
collected from one main explanation sentence for each component from the 
explanation sentences of “realizing components” field in Table 5.1-2 for the 
component considering the main function.  
 
Table 5.1-3. Future plant behavior after reactor trip operation 
Action/operation Future plant behavior Specific technical term 
Reactor trip 
operation 
Low (no) flow of heat in Reactor vessel 
Low (No) flow of heat of water in primary side of SG 
Low (No) flow of heat of steam in secondary side of SG 
Low (no) flow of mechanical energy in Turbine 
Low (no) flow of electrical energy in Generator 
Low (no) flow of electrical energy in Electric grid 
 
Hot shutdown 
 
The future plant behavior information is provided in Table 5.1-3. Then, the 
set of state changes (plant behaviors) are matched with the “specific term” 
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described in Subsection 3.7.2. From the table, it is found that in case of reactor 
trip operation, the state changes of influenced components are matched with the 
“specific term” and correlated with a technical term “hot shutdown”. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the future plant behavior after reactor trip operation is 
such that the plant is in hot shutdown condition. 
 
Safety injection and stopping RCP operation 
The counter actions of safety injection and stopping RCP operations are 
represented by the control structure cfs2 and cfs3, respectively, as can be seen in 
Figure 5.1-2. The safety injection controller (cfs2) changes the state sou12 in efs9 
(representing the energy flow of ECCS) from no output flow potential to high 
output flow potential, which indicates that there is enough electric power to be 
transferred through tra32 (high flow) to start the ECCS to provide cooling to the 
RCS. In this case, the objective obj4 to provide cooling the RCS through the 
ECCS is achieved (true). 
 
 
Figure 5.1-2. Part of MFM model related with safety injection and stopping RCS 
operation 
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On the other hand, the stopping RCP controller (cfs3) will stop the electric 
power flowing to the RCP (efs3), indicated by the no output flow potential in sou5. 
This condition impacts the state of tra19 to change from normal to no flow and 
then disables the objective obj2 to provide water to the RCS. Table 5.1-4 provides 
the state of function primitives before and after safety injection and stopping RCP 
operation. In addition, the explanation sentences of the pant behavior caused by 
safety injection and stopping RCP operation are provided in Table 5.1-5. 
 
Table 5.1-4. State of function primitives before and after safety injection and stopping 
RCS 
Counter action Initial state After counter action 
Safety injection sou12: no output flow potential 
tra32: no flow 
obj4: false 
tra4: low flow 
sou12: no output flow potential 
tra32: high flow 
obj4: true 
tra4: high flow 
Stopping RCP sou5: normal 
tra19: normal 
obj2: true 
tra5: normal 
sou5: no output flow potential 
tra19: no flow 
obj2: false 
tra5: no flow 
 
Table 5.1-5. Explanation sentences of plant behavior after safety injection and stopping 
RCP operation 
Functions MFM Model Realized components 
sou12 in efs9 High flow output potential of energy in 
sou12 
High output flow potential of electricity 
in ECCS 
tra32 in efs9 No flow of energy in tra12 No flow of electricity in ECCS 
tra4 in mfs1 High flow of mass in tra4 High flow of water in RCS 
sou5 in efs3 no flow output potential of energy in 
sou5 
no flow output flow potential of 
electricity in RCP 
tra19 in efs3 No flow of energy in tra19 No flow of electricity in RCP 
tra5 in mfs2 No flow of mass in tra5 No flow of water in RCP 
 
 From Table 5.1-5, it can be seen that the main components influenced by the 
safety injection and stopping the RCP are emergency core cooling system (ECCS), reactor 
coolant system (RCS) and reactor coolant pump (RCP). In addition, the future plant 
behavior after the counter actions can be derived from the realized components field in 
Table 5.1-5. There is no special term of the future plant behavior. 
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5.2. Check RCP restart criteria 
The related part of the MFM model of checking RCP restart criteria operation is 
provided in Figure 5.2-1. The counter action is modeled by the control function cfs4. 
The operation condition is the state of sto5 (pressurizer) and is correlated with the 
obj12 to actuate control function pco4 in cfs4 to change the state of sou5 in efs3 (RCP). 
Then, the impacts of the two possible counter actions to the other components and 
plant behavior can be investigated using cause-effect relation and influence 
propagation as can be seen in Table 5.2-1. 
 
 
Figure 5.2-1. Part of MFM model related with RCP restart criteria operation 
 
Table 5.2-1.  State of function primitives before and after check RCP restart criteria 
operation 
Action Pressurizer 
(sto5) level 
Initial state After counter action 
Check RCP restart 
criteria 
high sou5 (no output flow 
potential), efs3 (no flow), 
obj2 (false), tra5 (no flow) 
sou5 (high flow output 
potential), efs3 (high flow), 
obj2 (true), tra5 (high flow) 
low sou5 (no output flow 
potential), efs3 (no flow), 
obj2 (false), tra5 (no flow) 
sou5 (no output flow 
potential), efs3 (no flow), obj2 
(false), tra5 (no flow) 
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Table 5.2-2. Explanation sentences of plant behavior after check RCP criteria operation 
Functions MFM Model Realized components 
sou5 in efs3 High flow output potential of energy in 
sou5 
High flow output potential of electricity 
in RCP 
tra18 in efs3 High flow of energy in tra18 High flow of electricity in RCP 
tra5 in mfs2 High flow of mass in tra5 High flow of water in RCP 
 
The explanation sentences, derived from the set of change state in Table 5.2-1, for 
the counter action if the criteria for restarting the RCP is met, are given in Table 5.2-3. 
However, if the criteria is not met, the explanation sentences are the same in Table 5.1-5 
because the RCP is still not operated. Therefore, the components influenced by the 
counter action are RCP and RCS, the realized components field in Table 5.2-2 represent 
the future plant behavior. 
 
5.3. Identification and isolation of faulted steam generator 
The MFM model related with the isolating ruptured SG operation is shown in 
Figure 5.3-1. The isolation of ruptured SG is represented by the control flow structure 
cfs5 and control function pco5. In this case, the “low volume” in sto6 is the operation 
condition which represents the low or no steam contained radioactive material in the 
turbine (objective of the system).  Based on the causal reasoning of MFM, in order 
to make the low (no) volume in sto6, the transport function tra15 should be in low 
(no) flow. Therefore, the pco5 is actuated to change the state of tra16 from normal 
(high) flow to low (no) flow.   
According to cause-effect relation and influence propagation, the change of state 
of tra16 will affect downstream and upstream connections and the propagate to all 
other function primitive and the flow structure. The states of function primitives 
before and after the isolation of ruptured SG or closing the MSIV are given in Table 
5.3-1, which in turn the explanation sentences are generated for the counter action as 
can be seen in Table 5.3-2. 
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Figure 5.3-1. Part of MFM model isolation related with ruptured SG operation 
 
Table 5.3-1. States of function primitives after isolating of ruptured SG 
Counter action Initial state After counter action 
Isolation of 
ruptured SG 
tra15 (high flow), sto6 (high 
volume), sto7 (high volume), 
tra14 (high flow) 
tra15 (no flow), sto6 (no volume), 
sto7 (no volume), tra14 (no flow) 
 
Table 5.3-2. Explanation sentences of the influence of isolation of ruptured SG 
Functions MFM Model Realized components 
tra15 in mfs2 No flow of mass in tra15 No flow of steam in MSIV 
sto6 in mfs2 No volume of mass in sto6 No volume of steam in turbine 
sto7 in mfs2 No volume of mass in sto7 No volume of steam in condenser 
tra14 in msf2 No flow of mass in tra14 No flow of water in auxiliary feedwater 
system 
 
Based on the explanation sentences, it can be derived that the MSIV, turbine, 
condenser and auxiliary feedwater system are the components influenced by the 
isolation of ruptured SG operation. In addition, the list of explanation sentences in 
the realized components field in Table 5.3-2 is the representation of future plant 
behavior caused by the counter action.  
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5.4. RCS cooldown using steam dump through SG PORV or steam dump valve 
This step is executed after the level of faulted/intact SG has been regulated to the 
set point value and the safety injection (SI) has been stopped. The RCS is cooled 
down using steam dump through SG PORV if the condenser is not available. 
Otherwise, if the condenser is available, the steam dump valve is used to dump the 
steam. This thesis only discusses the RCS cooling down using steam dump through 
the steam dump valve. Figure 5.4-1 shows the MFM model related with the counter 
action. The counter action is modeled by the control structure cfs7 and the parameters 
are provided in Table 5.4-1. 
 
 
Figure 5.4-1. Part of MFM model related with RCS cooldown using steam dump valve 
operation 
 
After the reactor trip and safety injection operation, the reactor is in hot 
shutdown condition. It means that the residual heat remains in the system and should 
be removed by dumping the steam from the SG in order to cooldown the RCS. In 
case of the condenser is available, the steam can be dumped by bypassing the turbine 
and opening the steam dump valve to let the steam directly flow to the condenser. In 
Figure 5.4-1, the temperature level of the RCS is represented by the state of sto10 in 
efs15 (energy flow of RCS). Therefore, the operation condition is the low volume of 
sto10 which is correlated with the obj15, which in turn the control function pco7 is 
actuated to disable the barrier function bar11. If the barrier function is disabled, it 
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means that the mass or energy can be transferred through the function. Therefore, it 
can be considered that the barrier function acts as a transport function. The states of 
function primitives and the explanation sentences of the influence caused by the 
counter action are provided in Table 5.4-1 and Table 5.4-2, respectively. 
The components influenced by the counter actions are condenser, auxiliary 
feedwater and steam generator. In addition, one of the future plant behavior is “high 
volume of steam in condenser”. Other plant behaviors are provided in the realized 
components in Table 5.4-2. 
   
Table 5.4-1. States of functions before and after RCS cooldown operation 
Counter action Initial state After counter action 
RCS cooldown Bar11 (enable), sto7 (low 
volume), tra14 (low flow) 
Bar11 (disable), sto7 (high 
volume), tra14 (high flow) 
 
Table 5.4-2. Explanation sentences of influence of RCS cooldown operation 
Functions MFM Model Realized components 
Sto7 in mfs2 High volume of mass in sto7 High volume of steam in condenser 
Tra14 High flow of mass in tra14 High flow of water in auxiliary 
feedwater 
Sto4 in mfs2 High volume of water in sto4 High volume of water in SG 
   
 
5.5. Applicability Evaluations 
The additional information derived from the modeling of counter actions in 
executing the procedure step of the EOP of the SGTR accident is component 
influenced and future plant behavior caused by the counter actions. The additional 
information is presented to the operators in understandable way before they conduct 
the counter actions. Therefore, they will have enough knowledge about the purpose 
of the procedure step and the impact of their counter action related with the procedure 
step, which in turn it will help them to make decision and prepare for the next counter 
actions related with the future plant behavior. 
This section discusses the applicability of the additional information. The 
applicability is evaluated based on the contribution to the situation awareness and 
reducing the human errors both omission and commission errors. 
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5.5.1. Contribution to Situation Awareness  
As mentioned in Chapter 2 that situation awareness is the ability of operators 
to perceive and comprehend the information and based on those abilities, they 
should be able to predict the future event and prepare the next actions to anticipate 
the future event of the system. Regarding the prediction of the future event, this 
ability can be supported by the functional information because it can provide 
system and role of components and the system behavior. 
 
Table 5.5-1 Contribution of additional information derived to situation awareness for 
SGTR accident case 
Counter action Perception Comprehension Projection 
Reactor trip and 
safety injection 
• Receive the information 
about the state of reactor 
vessel, primary side and 
secondary side of SG 
• Receive information about 
the state of ECCS 
• Receive information about 
the level of RCS 
• Receive information about 
the state of RCP 
• Understand the state and level 
of reactor vessel, primary side 
and secondary side of SG 
• Understand the state of the 
ECCS 
• Understand the state and level 
of RCS 
• Understand the state of RCP 
• Monitor the state and level of 
reactor vessel, primary and 
secondary side of SG, ECCS, 
RCS and RCP 
• Prepare for anticipate the 
future state of reactor vessel, 
state and level of SG, state 
and level of RCS and the 
state of RCP 
Check RCP 
restart criteria 
• Receive information about 
the pressurizer level 
• Receive information about 
the state of RCP 
• Receive information about 
the state and level of RCS 
• Understand the level of 
pressurizer whether to restart 
the RCP or not 
• Understand the state of RCP, 
whether ON or OFF 
• Understand the state of RCS 
whether supplied by the RCP 
or not 
• Monitor the pressurizer 
level, state of RCP and the 
state and level of RCS 
• Prepare for the next action 
related to the change state of 
the RCP and RCS 
Identification 
and isolation of 
faulted SG 
• Receive information about 
the ruptured SG 
• Receive information about 
isolated ruptured SG 
• Receive information about 
the state of the MSIV, 
turbine and condenser 
• Understand which SG is 
ruptured  
• Understand the state after 
isolation the ruptured SG 
• Understand the state of the 
secondary system 
• Monitor the state of isolated 
ruptured SG 
• Monitor the intact SG and 
secondary system 
• Prepare and anticipate the 
future state of intact SG and 
secondary system 
 • •  • 
RCS cool down 
using steam 
dump valve 
• Receive the information 
about the state of steam 
dump valve which in “open 
position” 
• Receive the information 
about the level of steam in 
the condenser 
• Receive the information 
about the temperature level 
of the RCS  
• Understand that the steam will 
be delivered to the condenser 
by opening the steam dump 
valve 
• Understand the current level 
of dumped steam in the 
condenser 
• Understand the current 
temperature level of the RCS 
• Monitor the state of the 
steam dump valve, the 
condenser and the RCS.  
• Prepare for actions to 
anticipate the change of state 
of the steam dump valve, 
condenser and the RCS 
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The additional information (components influenced and future plant 
behavior) derived from the modeling of counter actions in executing of procedure 
steps discussed in previous section can be used to increase the situation awareness 
of operators in emergency conditions. The contributions of the functional 
information to the situation awareness of operators are summarized in Table 5.5-
1. From the functional information provided (future plant behavior), before 
conducting the counter actions, operators will have clear view about the purpose 
of the procedure steps and the impacts of the counter actions. Then, by having the 
information, operators should aware and monitor the components influenced and 
the plant behavior affected by the counter actions. 
An example of counter actions with lack of situation awareness is the accident 
happened during the mitigation of SGTR accident of Point Beach Unit 1 in 1975 
[64].  In the mitigation of the accident, the operators were slow to recognize the 
occurrence of steam generator tube rupture, slow to start the load reduction and 
slow to isolate the rupture steam generator. The above situation can be minimized 
if operators are aware about the situation of the plant. The situation awareness can 
be increased by providing the additional information, especially the future plant 
behavior, as summarized in Table 5.5-1.  
In the case of identification of the accident, it can be derived from the impact 
of the reactor trip and safety injection operation to the state of RCS, state and level 
of SG both primary and secondary side and also the state of RCP. Because the 
secondary side of the SG is also impacted by the operation action, operators 
should monitor the radiation level in the SG blowdown line. The ruptured SG can 
be identified by the high level of radioactive in the SG blowdown line. By having 
this information, it will make it faster for operators to identify the SGTR accident 
and to isolate the ruptured SG.  
 
5.5.2. Contribution to Reduce Human Errors 
Investigations related with the cause of the accidents especially in nuclear 
plants found that besides the technical factors, such as system malfunction caused 
by ageing of components, human errors also contribute to the accidents. It is found 
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in the United states, among the 180 significant events, 48% of them were caused 
by human errors [65]. Some efforts have been conducted to reduce the potential 
of human errors such as providing training program and improving the human 
machine interfaces including improved interfaces and operator support systems.  
Regarding the action conducted by operators, human errors can be divided 
into omission error and commission error. In case of mitigating accident of nuclear 
power plant following the instruction of the EOP, the omission error can be 
happened if operators omit or skip some important procedure steps for any reasons. 
First, because of the complexity of the procedure steps which cause operators 
difficult to understand the purpose of the procedure step. As their mitigation tasks 
are limited by time, then they decide to skip the procedure step. This behavior will 
make them fail to mitigate the accident and endanger the plant condition. 
On the other hand, the commission error related to a mistake that consists of 
doing something wrong. CBPs with complex and ambiguous instructions will 
cause operators difficult to understand the purpose of the procedure step which in 
turn they may make wrong decisions and take the wrong counter actions. In 
addition, it is also happened if the CBPs has lack of information. 
The above problems can be solved by providing the additional information to 
the CBP. The additional information provides the objective of the procedure step 
as well as the components influenced, and future plant behavior caused by the 
counter actions. By providing the additional information, operators will have clear 
view about what will happen in the plant and enough knowledge to do the counter 
action. Therefore, they will not skip or omit some procedure steps and the 
potential of omission error will be reduced. Otherwise, by having enough 
knowledge about the procedure step, it will help operators to make correct 
decision and counter actions. Therefore, the incident caused by the commission 
error will be reduced. 
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Chapter 6 
6. Preliminary Design of CBP User Interface with the Desirable 
Feature 
6.1. Process of Displaying the Additional Information 
This chapter discusses the preliminary design of the CBP user interface with the 
desirable feature. The desirable feature is the additional information: components 
influenced and future plant behavior. As the purpose of the study is to derive the 
proposed a CBP with the additional information feature, therefore in the preliminary 
design of the CBP, the focus only on displaying the additional information to the CBP 
user interface. In other words, the detail instruction of the procedure steps such as 
components to be controlled, parameter required to control the components and how 
to take the actions including the plant status will not be considered. 
In the preliminary design, the CBP has feature of displaying the additional 
information each time operators click on a specific procedure step. Benefits of this 
feature, before operator taking the counter actions, they will have clear view and 
understanding as well as knowledge about the purpose of the procedure step, the 
impact of their counter actions. Consequently, they will monitor the state of the 
influenced components and the plant behavior. Moreover, they will prepare for the 
actions related with the change of influenced components and anticipate the future 
plant behavior. 
As the preliminary design, the process of deriving the additional information and 
extracting the additional information to the CBP user interface is manually conducted. 
The process of deriving the additional information from the MFM mode is 
investigated manually using cause-effect relation and influence propagation (in hand 
investigation). The additional information, including objective of the procedure step, 
components influenced, and future plant behavior derived from the investigation is 
expressed in explanation sentences in order to make it easier for operators to 
understand the information. Then, the explanation sentences are collected separately 
based on the procedure steps. For example, the explanation sentences of a group of 
“Identification and isolation of ruptured SG” will be as provided in the Table 6.1-1.  
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Table 6.1-1. Group of explanation sentences for isolate ruptured SG 
Objectives To isolate the ruptured SG 
Components influenced MSIV, turbine, condenser, auxiliary feedwater 
Future plant behavior No flow of steam in MSIV 
No volume of steam in turbine   
No volume of steam in condenser 
No flow of water in auxiliary feedwater system 
 
Finally, the explanation sentences are extracted to the CBP user interface and 
displayed to the operators in understandable way each time the select on a specific 
procedure step. Figure 6.1-1 summarized the process of deriving and displaying the 
additional information to the CBP user interface. 
 
Figure 6.1-1. Process of displaying additional information to the CBP user interface 
 
In the future works, the process of deriving the additional information from the 
MFM model and displaying the additional information will be conducted 
automatically. It means that each time users or operators click on a specific procedure 
step, it will execute the program to derive the additional information from the MFM 
model. Then, the additional information in the form of explanation sentences will be 
displayed on the additional information field on the CBP user interface. 
 
 
69 
 
6.2. Design of the CBP User Interface 
The design of the proposed CBP with the desirable feature is based on the standard, 
the requirements of the representation 0f CBP user interface and also considering 
human factor engineering. Literature [21] mentions some requirements for the 
representation of the CBP user interface which are used in this study. Based on the 
requirements, the presentation of the CBP should include identification; basic steps; 
warning, caution and notes; lists; organizations; and formatting and screen layout. In 
addition, the CBP user interface should provide functionality for monitoring operator 
actions, planning and implementation and support for path monitoring and navigation. 
The identification of procedures involves the procedure title, procedure number, 
revision and date, high level objective and their category. Procedures are represented 
in basic steps which composed of verbs and direct objects. Warning, caution and notes 
which qualifies the required actions and decision, can be used to support the 
performance of a procedure. Lists formats are frequently used to present groups of 
items of actions, conditions, components, criteria and systems. Organization of 
procedure is one of important aspect of the CBP user interface because it is related 
with the successfulness of operators in using the CBP.  Finally, because of the 
limitation of visual display units, the procedure should be presented in convenience 
way whether in the flowchart-based format or text-based format or combination of 
flowchart-based and text-based format. 
Figure 6.2-1 shows the draft of layout of the presentation of the CBP user interface 
by considering the above requirements. Then the design of the CBP user interface with 
the additional information feature is provided in Figure 6.2-2. The figure is the initial 
display of the CBP before users or operators select a procedure step. After the operators 
click on a specific procedure step, the presentation of the CBP user interface is given 
in Figure 6.2-3. It can be seen that the additional information related with the impact 
of the counter actions is displayed on the additional information field of the CBP user 
interface. In addition, the CBP user interface also has a feature in which when the 
procedure step has been selected, the color of the procedure of step will be changed. 
In this case, the color is changed to green. The purpose of the color marking is to 
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remind the operators of their current position on the procedure step. In addition, it can 
be used to let other operators know the current actions of mitigating the accident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2-2. The initial display of the CBP user interface 
 
 
Procedure steps 
Warnings, cautions, notes 
Procedure step description 
Addition information 
Title 
version Date 
Figure 6.2-1. Draft of layout of the CBP user interface 
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Figure 6.2-3. Displaying the additional information on the CBP user interface 
 
To conclude, the preliminary design of the proposed CBP user interface with the 
desirable feature can be used as a basic idea to design the complete CBP user interface 
involving the detail description of procedure steps, plant status, and other useful 
features which increase the usability of the CBP and reduce the possibility of human 
error when using the CBP in mitigating the accident. Furthermore, in the future, the 
CBP user interface with the desirable features can be implemented in real plants. 
 
6.3. Evaluation of the Design of the CBP User Interface 
As a proposed design, the CBP user interface should be evaluated. The evaluation 
study will be conducted as an objective assessment of the proposed CBP prototype. 
The purpose of the evaluation study is to derive the inputs and recommendations of 
on how to improve the functionality and the user interface of the proposed CBP. In 
addition, it is also intended to increase the usability of the CBP. This section discusses 
on how to evaluate the proposed CBP user interface. 
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Evaluation materials 
The evaluation study uses the proposed CBP user interface with the additional 
information, CBP user interface without the additional information, and some questioners 
which participants should respond related with the usage of the CBP. 
 
Participants 
The participants can be students from nuclear engineering department or workers of 
nuclear power plants/research institutes.  
 
Evaluation methods 
Figure 6.3-1 shows the method to evaluate the proposed CBP user interface. There 
are two aspects that will be assessed through the evaluation: the functionality and the 
usability of the CBP user interface. The functionality of the CBP user interface can be 
assessed by providing the participants with the two types of CBP, which are CBP with 
the additional information and without additional information. 
 
Figure 6.3-1. Method to evaluate the proposed CBP user interface 
 
In the initial phase of the evaluation, participants will be given an accident scenario 
and they are asked to use both the CBP how to mitigate the accident and should take more 
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consideration to the impact of the counter actions. In the end of the tasks, participants will 
be given some questions related with their activities using the both CBPs. Such questions 
will be “which CBPs more appropriate to mitigate the accident?” or “which CBP do you 
prefer to use? Give the reasons” or other questions related with the functionalities of the 
CBP. 
In the future phase of evaluation, participants will be given a task to mitigate an 
accident using the two types of CBP. In this evaluation, besides giving some questions in 
the end of assessment, the time of operators completing the counter actions using the both 
CBPs will be recorded and compared.  
In case of usability evaluation of the proposed CBP, operators should respond to 
some questionnaires related the representation of the CBP.  As an example, some survey 
about the suitability of the device such as the screen size and display brightness will be 
asked to the participants. In addition, participants will be asked related with the interface 
and how the participants use the functions and features in the CBP interface as well as 
their feeling while using the CBP. Besides the questions and the survey, participants 
should give some suggestion and recommendations in order to improve the functionalities 
and the usability of the proposed CBP. 
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7. Conclusions and Future Works 
Currently, most of modern main control rooms of nuclear power plants are equipped 
with the advanced human machine interfaces and operator support systems including 
computer-based procedures (CBPs). CBPs provide some features and offer benefits 
compare with the paper-based procedures. Information is provided more dynamic in 
CBPs and there is a link to connect to other procedures easily.  
The design of the CBPs should refer to the related standard and consider the human 
factor engineering to prevent the human error in using the CBPs. This study proposes a 
CBP with the desirable feature by adding the additional information in order to increase 
the usability of the CBP. In addition, it is also intended to increase the situation awareness 
of the operators. The additional information is components influenced and future plant 
behavior as the impact of the counter actions of operators in mitigating the accident 
following the instruction in procedure step of the EOP.  
The method to derive the additional information is by applying an SGTR accident to 
the MFM model of PWR plant. The counter actions are modeled by the MFM control 
functions. The investigation to derive the information about the components influenced 
and future plant behavior is conducted based on cause-effect relation and influence 
propagation. Future plant behavior is useful information and help operators to understand 
the plant state and anticipate the future events. It will increase the situation awareness of 
operators and then minimize the human errors caused by operators’ actions especially in 
an emergency condition. The additional information is applicable to increase the situation 
awareness and to reduce the human errors considering the mitigation of SGTR accident 
in the past with the lack of situation awareness. 
 
Contributions 
The results of the study, such as the additional information of the impact the counter 
actions in mitigating an accident, have contributions to the increasing of the situation 
awareness of operators by supporting the achievements of perception, comprehension and 
projection abilities. In addition, it also contributes to reduce the potential of human errors 
caused by the counter actions both errors of omission and errors of commission. 
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Furthermore, the technical contribution of the study is the extension of the 
implementation of MFM modeling methodology. First, this study proposes the 
application of MFM control function model the counteractions (automatic or operator 
action) of executing the procedure step of an EOP. The counter action (represented by an 
MFM control function) is actuated based on the operation condition and objective of the 
system to produce a new state of a function primitive by changing the state of a function 
primitive (a controlled component). Second, this study also proposes some new states of 
definition of MFM model which are suitable for the analysis of the impact of the counter 
actions based on cause-effect and influence propagation rules. Furthermore, this study 
also enhances the benefit of MFM modeling methodology for causal reasoning analysis.  
 
 
Future Works 
Future works include the investigation of modeling the counter action to other 
procedure steps in the EOP and the development of a technique to explain the effects and 
side effects of counter operations in understandable way for operators. In addition, 
develop the CBP user interface with the additional information feature which the 
information is gathered automatically from the MFM model. 
Moreover, the proposed CBP user interface with the desirable feature (additional 
information) will be evaluated by the real operators in order to validate the design and to 
increase the usability and the functionality of the CBP. It is expected that by providing 
the additional information related with the functions of components and future plant 
behavior will reduce the commission errors of operators because operators will 
understand the intention of counter actions, especially in an emergency condition. 
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